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ABSTRACT 
This thesis examines the relationship between spot prices, futures prices, and ending stocks 
for storable commodities.  We used Granger causality and DAGs to determine causal relationships 
and cointegration tests to determine long-run relationships.  We use VAR/VECM and consider 
innovation accounting techniques to see how volatility in one market affects the price behavior 
and volatility in the other market.  Results suggest that for agricultural commodities, innovations 
in futures price permanently increase the level of spot prices while accounting for much of spot 
price variance over time. For national oil, shocks to futures price decrease the level of spot price 
in the long run. In regional oil markets, there are transitory impulse responses. Futures price plays 
a small role in the volatility of spot prices for oil over time.  Overall results are mixed, with oil 
suggesting futures markets may have a price stabilizing effect and agriculture commodities 
indicating spot price destabilization. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Commodities, particularly energy and agricultural commodities, are known to have volatile 
markets that exhibit large price fluctuations.  We can look back only a few years for an example of 
this extreme volatility; in July of 2014 the spot price of WTI crude at Cushing, OK was around 
$100 per barrel, by early January 2015 the price had declined by over half and was less than $50 
per barrel.  Other commodities tend to exhibit the same types of volatility.  The nature and causes 
of commodity price volatility have been explored in academic literature as well as debated among 
politicians, market participants, and the general public.   
Futures markets have received much widespread attention over the last few years. This is 
partly because national and international commodity markets have become more integrated and 
partly because of the increased financialization of the commodity markets with commodities more 
frequently being included as an asset class as part of a diversified investment portfolio.  The general 
public sentiment with regards to futures trading appears to be more negative than positive with the 
widespread belief that speculation within futures markets leads to adverse effects on the market.  
However, much of the literature and empirical evidence suggests that futures trading, to include 
speculative trading, allows for price stabilization. 
It is believed that organized futures markets developed organically to meet the needs of 
market participants and as a response to the price volatility seen in commodities (Telser and 
Higinbotham 1977).  The participants within the commodity markets faced not only price risk, but 
quantity and quality risk, and were searching for avenues to reduce their marketing risk and make 
trade more efficient.  It is unclear exactly when and where standardized futures trading began. 
However, some trace its roots back to the Dōjima Rice Market in Japan where trading standardized 
rice contracts began in 1730 (Kolb and Overdahl 2006; Schaede 1989).  The trading of futures 
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contracts in the U.S. is thought to have developed for the grain trade in Chicago in the 1860s.  Since 
then, futures trading has taken off on a global scale with contracts for many different commodities 
and financial instruments as well as exchanges in the U.S. and around the world.  
These futures markets allow for price discovery by market participants, the smoother 
allocation of commodities over time, as well as the transfer of risk from hedgers to speculators.  
Price discovery is the process of participants making bids to buy and sell the commodity which 
allows for the market forces to reveal information about future prices of a commodity. This process 
enables market participants to know the going rate for a commodity in the future, and the 
transparency of an organized market also allows for information to be disseminated to non-market 
participants. Since futures contracts for storable commodities specify the delivery of a product at 
some point in the future, these contracts can link someone who has the commodity to someone who 
needs the commodity at a set point in the future.  This allows economic agents to link supply and 
demand needs of products while allowing for a smoother allocation of commodities.  Finally, 
futures markets allow speculators to enter in search of profit.  Since hedgers are looking to alleviate 
a portion of their risk, speculators provide liquidity to the market by taking the opposite side of a 
transaction.  In doing so, speculators bear some risk of adverse price changes by providing insurance 
to hedgers.  These speculators are generally happy to bear this risk since they believe they can 
profit. Thus, the distribution of products through time, price discovery and risk transfer are believed 
to alleviate some of the erratic price movements, or volatility, that is common in the commodity 
markets.  However, this price stabilizing belief does not always play out in practice. For this reason, 
we examine the relationship between the futures price and spot prices for oil and agricultural 
commodities. 
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The objective of this study is to add to the body of literature looking at how futures markets 
affect spot price behavior.  While not conclusive, much of the literature in this area suggests that 
futures markets either have no effects on spot prices or they have a price stabilizing effect.  We are 
able to apply a methodology that, to our knowledge, has not been applied to this particular area of 
research. 
Our study is focusing on four storable commodities: soybeans, corn, hard red spring wheat, 
and crude oil.  We consider monthly data for futures prices, spot prices, and ending stocks.  For the 
agricultural commodities, we are looking at spot price and stock data for North Dakota, and for oil, 
we look at spot price and stock data nationally as well as regionally for four of the five PAD 
districts.  We utilize VAR/VECM as well as impulse responses and variance decompositions to 
examine the relationships among the variables. 
Our agricultural results do not agree with much of the conclusions from previous studies in 
this area.  For the agricultural commodities, we find that futures markets increase the level of spot 
prices and they account for a large portion of the variability of spot prices over time.  In addition, 
this increased price level remains elevated up to 36 months with no sign of a decrease, leading us 
to conclude these effects are likely permanent.  The oil results seem to conform more to the previous 
literature, with futures markets decreasing the level of spot prices in the long run at the national 
level, and futures markets accounting for a much smaller portion of that volatility overall and over 
time compared to the agricultural commodities. The PADD’s results indicate transitory increases 
in spot price levels with futures prices accounting for a small portion of volatility.  
The remainder of the thesis is organized as follows.  Section two will discuss the relevant 
literature.  In section three we discuss the theoretical model and its derivation.  The data and data 
construction methods are discussed in the fourth section.  The empirical methodology is discussed 
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in the fifth section, to include unit root tests, cointegration tests, Granger causality and directed 
acyclic graphs, VAR/VECM, as well as impulse responses and variance decomposition.  Finally, 
the results of our estimated models are discussed in section 6 and concluding remarks in section 7. 
  
 5 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
There are generally two views on commodity prices, the theory of storage and the idea that 
futures prices can be fragmented into an expected risk premium and an expected future spot price 
(Fama and French 1987).  The theory of storage suggests that the basis, or the difference between 
the futures price and spot price,  can be explained by the interest rate, the storage cost and the 
convenience yield (Kaldor 1939, Working 1948; Brennan 1958; Telser 1958).  The convenience 
yield is the return of holding inventory, which arises because of inventories’ role in reducing 
production and marketing costs as well as the reduced risk of stockout (Pindyck 2001). The idea 
that futures price is made up of a risk premium and the expected future spot price can be expressed 
in basis form, where the basis is equal to the sum of the expected risk premium and an expected 
change in spot price.  Fama and French (1987) examined these two competing theories of 
commodity pricing and found that basis varies in response to interest rates and convenience yields, 
lending support for the theory of storage. They also found forecast power for ten commodities, and 
time-varying expected premiums for five commodities. 
  Grossman (1977) showed with the introduction of futures markets, there is a benefit to 
insurance, and the transfer of information from informed to uninformed traders allows for the better 
allocation of goods through time.  Pindyck (2001) explains the short run dynamics of commodity 
markets and shows how spot prices, futures prices, and inventories are related.  He examines these 
market dynamics and interrelationships for crude oil, heating oil, and gasoline.   
In 1958, the U.S. banned futures trading in onions due to the belief that they increased 
variability in cash prices so much so that it outweighed the hedging benefits that futures provide.  
Working (1960) examined the onion market and found that, in years following World War II where 
there was substantial hedging activity, there was reduced intraseasonal and intramonth variability 
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in spot onion prices.  Gray (1963) compared seasonal ranges of onion spot prices for four different 
time periods, the period 1922-1941 which preceding futures trading, a period 1942-1949 with 
futures trading but with little trading activity, the period 1949-1958 where there was significant 
futures trading activity, and the period 1958-1962 for the period after futures trading was banned.  
Gray found that the two periods without futures trading and the period with little trading activity 
exhibited similar and larger seasonal price ranges than the price range found in the period where 
there was significant futures trading activity.  Johnson (1973) also examined the onion market for 
the period 1930-1968.  He updated both Workings’ and Grays’ previous studies with more recent 
data and found that the period of substantial hedging activity and the period following the ban of 
futures trading showed similar price patterns for both time periods.  Johnson ultimately conducted 
his own analysis by using a few different methods of price performance.  Ultimately, taking all 
results together, Johnson concluded that futures markets have no significant effect on price 
performance. 
Powers (1970) analyzed pork bellies and live cattle weekly cash prices using the variate 
difference method for four years prior to futures trading and four years after the introduction of 
futures trading; Powers found that after the introduction of futures trading, the variance of the 
random element of prices was reduced for both live cattle and pork bellies.  Tomek (1971) examined 
wheat for two different 20-year periods, 1841-1860 to represent a period before futures trading and 
1891-1910 to represent a period after futures trading had been introduced.  Tomek found the 
average cash price difference for each month in each period and discovered in 10 out of 12 months 
the average difference was smaller for the latter period with futures trading.  Taylor and Leuthold 
(1974) examined cash live cattle where they analyzed Chicago and Omaha cash price for 1957-
1964, a period prior to live cattle futures markets, and 1965-1972 for a period after the introduction 
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of futures.  They found that the monthly and weekly cash live cattle price variance was significantly 
reduced for the period 1965-1972 while the annual variation was reduced but not significantly 
changed.   The price effects of futures trading for onions, potatoes, pork bellies, lean hogs, live 
cattle, and frozen concentrated orange juice were investigated by Cox (1976).  Cox found that in 
periods of futures trading, market information was increased, and the markets were more efficient, 
with six of seven commodities having a reduced coefficient of variation with futures markets.  
Cattle and Hog prices were also examined by Tomek (1980) by the variate difference method, 
finding that on balance, futures trading does not have a significant effect on the variability of the 
random price component.  Brorsen et al. (1989) studied the period 1957-1982 using daily data and 
found that the presence of live cattle futures increased the standard deviation of the daily cash 
market changes.  Weaver and Banerjee (1990) found that live cattle futures did not affect the cash 
market volatility.  Antoniou and Foster (1992) utilized a GARCH model with weekly data before 
and after the introduction of futures trading for Brent crude oil to find that futures had no effect of 
the spot market volatility while improving the efficiency of the spot market.  Netz (1995) using data 
from 1858-1890 found that the introduction of wheat futures caused a significant decline in the 
coefficient of variation of spot price. 
Futures trading for the housing/mortgage industry was introduced in 1975 when futures 
contracts based on mortgage-backed bonds guaranteed by the Government National Mortgage 
Association (GNMA) were introduced.  These GNMA futures have been studied several times to 
see the effects of the futures on the spot market.  Froewiss (1978) regressed weekly percent changes 
in spot GNMA prices against ten-year U.S. government bonds for before and after the introduction 
of futures trading.  Froewiss concludes that the introduction of futures markets has not had a 
destabilizing effect of the spot market.  Contrary to Froewiss, Figlewski (1981) found that GNMA 
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futures trading led to increased volatility in the GNMA spot market.    Futures trading had no effect 
on the GNMA spot market volatility in the study by Simpson and Ireland (1982).  Corgel and Gay 
(1984) used intervention analysis to determine that the GNMA cash market saw a significant 
decline in volatility after the introduction of futures trading.   
There have also been several studies done in relation to financial futures other than GNMA.  
Bortz (1984) found that treasury bond futures decrease the volatility of the treasury bond spot 
market. Simpson and Ireland (1985) found that futures markets had no effect on the cash market 
for treasury bills.  Harris (1989) found that the introduction of S&P 500 index futures had no 
economically significant effect on the S&P 500 stocks’ cash market volatility. Gulen and Mayhew 
(2000) examined stock market volatility in 25 countries before and after the introduction of equity 
index futures trading.  For the U.S. and Japan, futures trading increased volatility while volatility 
was either unchanged or reduced in all other countries. Board et al. (2001) examined the effect of 
futures trading volume on the volatility of the equity spot market.  They use a stochastic volatility 
(SV) model for the study. SV models, unlike a GARCH, assume that an unobserved factor is the 
driver of conditional volatility.  They conclude that futures trading has no effect on the spot market 
volatility, and spot trading has no effect on spot market volatility.    
Dimpfl et al. (2017) looked at the relationship between spot and futures prices for corn, 
wheat, soybeans, soybean oil, soybean meal, feeder cattle, live cattle, and lean hogs.  They use 
information share methodology of Hasbrouck to estimate the contribution of spot and futures prices 
to price discovery.  For all commodities Dimpf et al. find that the spot market is the primary 
determinant of the long run efficient price and futures markets contribute less than 10% to the 
common efficient price variance showing that futures markets play only a small role in price 
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discovery.   Thus, the authors conclude that futures speculation does not distort spot markets in the 
long run.  
Irwin et al. (2009) claim the argument that speculation is the cause for bubbles in commodity 
prices is false.  The authors make a few points to support their position: (1) critics of speculators 
have a misunderstanding of how futures markets work, (2) in times of price volatility, activity in 
futures markets has not been “excessive”, (3) Granger causality tests show there is no causation 
between futures price changes and position changes.  Buyuksahin and Harris (2011) used Granger 
causality to find that hedge funds and noncommercial traders position changes do not Granger cause 
crude oil price changes.  Sanders and Irwin (2011) examine commodity index positions for corn, 
soybeans, as well as Kansas City and Chicago wheat for 2004-2009.  Granger causality suggests no 
causal relationship between commercial index positions and commodity price changes while long-
horizon regressions cannot reject the null hypothesis that commercial index positions have no 
impact on futures prices.  The literature related to speculation and oil prices was surveyed by 
Fattouh et al. (2013).  They find that the evidence does not support the idea that speculation drives 
oil spot price and instead conclude that the prices within the oil market are reflected by economic 
fundamentals.  Killian and Murphy (2014) utilize a VAR to examine the oil markets and account 
for the role of inventories, which much of the previous literature has not done.  They show that the 
business cycle is the main driver of the real oil price and the drastic increase in oil price from 2003-
2008 was primarily driven by shifts in the demand for oil consumption and not speculation.  
There are a few studies that examine how futures trading/speculation affects the volatility 
of spot prices.  Crain and Lee (1996) studied how thirteen different government farm programs over 
the period 1950-1993 have affected wheat spot and futures price volatility.  They observed that spot 
and futures volatility generally move together and for a majority of the period spot volatility was 
 10 
higher than futures volatility.  Among other things, using Granger causality, they found evidence 
that volatility moves from the futures market to the spot market for wheat.  Less prominently, 
volatility in the spot market also Granger causes futures market volatility.  However, futures 
volatility has a larger and more persistent impact on spot volatility.  Yang et al. (2005) studied 
futures trading volume and cash price volatility with Granger causality and forecast error variance 
decomposition.  They examine seven commodities (corn, soybeans, sugar, wheat, cotton, hogs, and 
cattle) in two different sub-periods (1992-1995, 1997-2001) and found that unexpected futures 
trading volume Granger causes cash price volatility for all seven commodities in both subperiods.  
Looking at the Indian markets, Sehgal et al. (2012) filtered futures trading volume into expected 
and unexpected components using the Hodrick-Prescott filter, and then used Granger causality and 
GARCH to analyze the effect of futures trading volume on spot price volatility of guar seeds, 
turmeric, soya bean, black pepper, barley, maize, and castor seed over the period of April 2004 to 
March 2012.  The authors found that unexpected increased futures trading volume is associated 
with increased spot price volatility for 5 out of the 7 commodities they studied.  In the case of black 
pepper, the reverse was observed where an increase in spot price volatility tended to affect futures 
trading volume.   
Bohl and Stephan (2013) examine whether futures speculation destabilizes commodity spot 
price.  GARCH is used to examine how conditional spot price volatility is affected by speculative 
open interest for corn, crude oil, natural gas, soybeans, sugar, and wheat over two different ten-year 
periods, Oct. 1992-Sep. 2002 and Oct. 2002-Sep. 2012.  They are not able to find evidence that 
growing futures speculation destabilize commodity spot price.  Futures markets speculation and 
spot price destabilization was also tested by Kim (2015) for 14 different commodities.  Kim used a 
GARCH model to measure the effect of futures trading activity on spot volatility.  Kim finds that 
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speculative trading activity either decreases or has no significant effect on spot price volatility 
except for live cattle.  Sharma and Malhotra (2015) also examined the effect of futures trading 
activity on the volatility of the guar seed spot market.  They also use Granger causality and find 
that an unexpected increase in futures volume precedes increased volatility in the guar seed spot 
market.  Using a GARCH model, they find that there is a positive relationship between futures 
trading volume and spot price volatility.   
Gupta and Varma (2016) looked at how futures markets affect the spot market for Indian 
rubber.  Using Granger causality, they found two-way causality between futures volatility and spot 
volatility.  They also found two-way Granger causality between spot volatility and futures volume. 
Mayer et al. (2017) looked at the effects of futures trading on spot price volatility for metals; 
specifically, copper, gold, palladium, platinum, and silver over the period of January 1993 – 
December 2013.  The authors used Granger causality tests to examine the causal relationship 
between trading activity and spot price volatility. To observe relationships between trading 
positions and volatility, Mayer et al. use an EGARCH model. Their results suggested that there is 
less evidence that futures trading activity has a substantial effect on spot prices and volatility, but 
there is stronger evidence to suggest that spot prices and volatility drive changes in trading activity.   
The application of DAGs has been gaining traction in the economics literature, especially 
in conjunction with VAR and ECM.  Bessler and Akleman (1998) use a DAG and VAR to examine 
retail beef and pork prices.  Roh and Bessler (1999) use a DAG to show that vehicle occupant death 
is caused by vehicle safety devices, income, and vehicle mileage.  Bessler et al. (2003) look at the 
relationships of five international wheat markets with DAG’s, VAR and VECM’s, finding U.S. and 
Canada are the leaders in pricing wheat.  Bessler and Yang (2003) employ DAG’s to determine 
causal orderings of innovations for VAR and ECM for analysis of the world’s largest stock markets.  
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Awokuse and Bessler (2003) use DAG’s and VAR to replicate Sims’ 1986 model of the U.S. 
Economy; interestingly, they present DAG’s with a significance level of up to 30% to achieve an 
unambiguous causal path.  Grain prices in Illinois, grain prices at the U.S. Gulf, and the barge 
market were examined with DAG’s and ECM’s by Haigh and Bessler (2004), discovering the 
Illinois grain market is strongly affected by the barge and commodity export markets.  Awokuse 
(2005) used DAG’s and VAR/ECM to examine how macroeconomic policy effects agricultural 
prices.  Yang et al. (2006) use DAG’s along with VAR to investigate the transmission of inflation 
among G-7 nations, finding U.S. inflation to have a large effect of other nations inflation. Refalo 
(2009) found that China had little impact on the price volatility of international oil markets using 
DAGs and ECM. Ji (2012) utilized DAGs along with partial least squares and VECM to look at 
what mechanisms are driving crude oil prices.  Li et al. (2013) used DAG’s to examine foreign 
direct investment and economic growth, finding economic growth causes foreign direct investment 
into developing countries, as well as foreign direct investment causing economic growth in 
developed countries. Ji and Fan (2015) examined five international oil markets using DAG and 
ECM, with results suggesting oil markets have diverged from equilibrium since 2010 and WTI 
beginning to reflect local supply/demand conditions.  Miljkovic et al. (2016) applied DAGs to show 
direct causal relations among variables within the energy complex and illustrate endogeneity issues 
among variables.  Xu (2017) employed DAG’s and ECM to examine corn prices across seven 
Midwestern states and found that Iowa dominated corn pricing throughout the crop year.  Ji et al. 
(2018) look at the drivers of natural gas price using a DAG and ECM and find oil price causes 
natural gas price. 
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3. ECONOMIC MODEL 
We follow Kawai (1983) to derive our economic model.  The use of this particular model is 
justified since it follows from Muth’s (1961) work on rational expectations and it takes into account 
consumption, production, and storage while explaining the behavior of spot price volatility in the 
absence of futures markets as well as in the presence of futures markets.  Thus, following Kawai, 
we derive mathematically the decision-making problems faced by risk-averse price taking 
consumers, producers, inventory holding dealers, and pure speculators. 
3.1. Agents Optimizing Behavior 
3.1.1. Consumer 
The price taking consumer can maximize utility subject to a budget constraint to obtain the 
demand for a commodity at time 𝑡.  Their demand can be expressed as, 
𝐶𝑡
𝑖 = 𝑎0
𝑖 − 𝑎𝑖𝑠𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡
𝑖 (1) 
where 𝐶𝑡
𝑖 is the demand, 𝑖 is an individual consumer, 𝑎0
𝑖  and 𝑎𝑖 are fixed constants, 𝑠𝑡 is the spot 
price at time 𝑡, and 𝜀𝑡
𝑖 is a disturbance term that represents an individual’s characteristics. 
3.1.2. Commodity Producer 
Producers make a production decision at time 𝑡 for an output that will be produced at time 
𝑡 + 1.  When the decision is made at time 𝑡, the spot price in period 𝑡 + 1, 𝑠𝑡+1, is not known.  
However, the output in period 𝑡 + 1, 𝑄𝑡+1, is known.  We assume the producer holds no inventories.  
The producer will maximize their expected utility of profit: 
𝐸𝑡𝑈
𝑝(Π𝑡+1
𝑝 ) (2) 
s.t.  Π𝑡+1
𝑝 = 𝑠𝑡+1𝑄𝑡+1
𝑝 − 𝜌𝐺(𝑄𝑡+1
𝑝 ) (3) 
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where 𝑝 is an individual producer, 𝐸𝑡 is the expectation operator, 𝑈
𝑝(⋅) is a strictly concave von 
Neuman-Morgenstern utility function, Πt+1
𝑝
 is producer’s profit at time 𝑡 + 1, 𝐺(⋅) is a strictly 
convex cost function which is known to the producer at time 𝑡, and 𝜌 is the market rate of interest 
plus one. This market rate of interest plus one, 𝜌, is utilized since capital resources are committed 
at time 𝑡 and profit is not realized until 𝑡 + 1. 
We assume the cost function is quadratic to ensure a linear form of commodity production 
can be obtained.  Thus, the cost can be represented as 𝐺(𝑄𝑡+1
𝑝 ) =
1
2
𝑔(𝑄𝑡+1
𝑝 + 𝜀𝑡
𝑝)
2
, 𝑔 > 0, where 
𝜀𝑡
𝑝
 is a disturbance affecting the cost function.  Thus, the new profit can be represented as:  
Π𝑡+1
𝑝 = 𝑠𝑡+1𝑄𝑡+1
𝑝 −
𝜌𝑔
2
(𝑄𝑡+1
𝑝 + 𝜀𝑡
𝑝)
2
(4) 
We also assume constant absolute risk aversion (CARA), implying an agent will hold less risky 
assets as wealth increases.  Hence our utility function has the form,  
𝑈𝑝(Π) = −𝑒−𝑟
𝑝Π (5) 
where 𝑟𝑝 is the Arrow-Pratt coefficient of absolute risk aversion.  Thus, the larger 𝑟𝑝 is, the more 
risk averse the agent is. The final assumption is that 𝑠𝑡+1 is normally distributed.  This gives our 
expected utility function the form, 
𝐸𝑡𝑈
𝑝(Π𝑡+1
𝑝 ) = −𝑒−𝑟
𝑝EtΠ𝑡+1
𝑝
+
1
2
(𝑟𝑝)2𝑉𝑡Π𝑡+1
𝑝
(6)  
where 𝑉𝑡 is the conditional variance operator such that 𝑉𝑡Π𝑡+1
𝑝
 is defined as 𝐸𝑡(Π𝑡+1
𝑝 − 𝐸𝑡Π𝑡+1
𝑝 )
2
.   
Mathematically, the same result as maximizing the expected utility, 𝐸𝑡𝑈
𝑝(Π𝑡+1
𝑝 ), can be 
achieved by maximizing: 
𝐸𝑡Π𝑡+1
𝑝 −
1
2
𝑟𝑝𝑉𝑡Π𝑡+1
𝑝
(7) 
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Thus, we must maximize 𝐸𝑡(𝑠𝑡+1)𝑄𝑡+1
𝑝 −
𝜌𝑔
2
(𝑄𝑡+1
𝑝 + 𝜀𝑡
𝑝)
2
−
1
2
𝑟𝑝𝑉𝑡(𝑠𝑡+1)(𝑄𝑡+1
𝑝 )
2
.  Taking 
the partial derivative with respect to 𝑄𝑡+1
𝑝
 and solving yields the optimal production quantity, 
𝑄𝑡+1
𝑝 =
𝐸𝑡𝑠𝑡+1 − 𝜌𝑔𝜀𝑡
𝑝
𝜌𝑔 + 𝑟𝑝𝑉𝑡𝑠𝑡+1
(8) 
which shows optimal production is positively related to the expected spot price, 𝐸𝑡𝑠𝑡+1.  It is 
inversely related to the discount factor 𝜌, the cost function 𝑔, the cost function disturbance 𝜀𝑡
𝑝
, the 
risk aversion coefficient 𝑟𝑝, and the variance of spot price, 𝑉𝑡𝑠𝑡+1.   
We can now consider maximizing expected utility in the presence of futures trading.  The 
producer can enter into a forward contract with a known price at time 𝑡 to deliver or receive delivery 
of a quantity of the commodity at time 𝑡 + 1.  The producer will now maximize 𝐸𝑡𝑈
𝑝(Π𝑡+1
𝑝∗ ) where: 
Π𝑡+1
𝑝∗ = 𝑠𝑡+1𝑄𝑡+1
𝑝∗ − 𝜌𝐺(𝑄𝑡+1
𝑝∗ ) + 𝑅𝑡
𝑝(𝑠𝑡+1 − 𝑓𝑡) (9) 
The quantity of futures contracts, 𝑅𝑡
𝑝
, can be positive, negative, or zero.  The futures price 
𝑓𝑡 is for delivery in period 𝑡 + 1.  The presence of the futures market is denoted by ∗ in the 
superscript.  Assumptions are the same as before with the cost function being quadratic, constant 
absolute risk aversion, and normally distributed spot price.  Thus, we must maximize: 
𝐸𝑡(𝑠𝑡+1)(𝑄𝑡+1
𝑝∗ + 𝑅𝑡
𝑝) −
𝜌𝑔
2
(𝑄𝑡+1
𝑝∗ + 𝜀𝑡
𝑝)
2
− 𝑅𝑡
𝑝𝑓𝑡 −
1
2
𝑟𝑝(𝑄𝑡+1
𝑝∗ + 𝑅𝑡
𝑝)
2
𝑉𝑡𝑠𝑡+1 (10) 
We find the optimal number of futures contracts by taking the partial derivative with respect 
to 𝑅𝑡
𝑝
  to obtain, 
𝑅𝑡
𝑝 = −𝑄𝑡+1
𝑝∗ + 𝑍𝑡
𝑝
(11a) 
where, 
𝑍𝑡
𝑝 =
𝐸𝑡𝑠𝑡+1 − 𝑓𝑡
𝑟𝑝𝑉𝑡𝑠𝑡+1
(11b) 
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Substituting the optimal futures contracts back into the expected utility and taking the partial 
derivative with respect to 𝑄𝑡+1
𝑝∗
 yields the optimal production quantity: 
𝑄𝑡+1
𝑝∗ =
𝑓𝑡
𝜌𝑔
− 𝜀𝑡
𝑝
(11c) 
Thus, the optimal production depends on the futures price 𝑓𝑡, the cost function disturbance 
𝜀𝑡
𝑝
, the discount factor 𝜌, and the cost function coefficient 𝑔.  The optimal quantity of futures 
contracts is the sum of 𝑍𝑡
𝑝
 and the negative quantity of production.  We can see that the optimal 
production does not depend on attitudes of risk or expected spot price and is independent of the 
futures trading decisions.   
The quantity of futures contracts is divided into two parts; the hedging component which is 
the opposite of the production decision, −𝑄𝑡+1
𝑝∗
, and the speculative component 𝑍𝑡
𝑝
.  The speculative 
component reflects the producer potential gain per unit of the commodity purchased in futures 
which is the difference of the expected future spot price 𝐸𝑡𝑠𝑡+1 and futures price 𝑓𝑡.  Therefore, the 
producer uses futures trading to hedge as well as to earn speculative profits when the opportunity 
arises.   
3.1.3. Inventory Holding Dealer 
When commodities are storable, there may exist agents who hold inventories of 
commodities from period to period.  We can call these agents inventory holding dealers.  When we 
take the case of a risk-averse, price taking dealer in the absence of futures trading, the dealer 
maximizes 𝐸𝑡𝑈
𝑑(Π𝑡+1
𝑑 ) such that, 
Π𝑡+1
𝑑 = 𝑠𝑡+1𝐼𝑡
𝑑 − 𝜌𝑠𝑡𝐼𝑡
𝑑 − 𝐻(𝐼𝑡
𝑑) (12) 
where 𝑑 represents an individual dealer, 𝐼𝑡
𝑑 is the stock of commodity inventory purchased in time 
𝑡, and 𝐻(⋅) is the holding cost of inventory with the usual convexity property.  Like before, the 
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discount factor 𝜌 is multiplied to the purchase cost of the commodity in time 𝑡.  Kawai assumes the 
holding cost of inventory is made up of the cost of deviating from a target level of inventory 𝐼?̅? +
𝜀𝑡
𝑑 (where 𝜀𝑡
𝑑 is a disturbance affecting the target stock at time 𝑡) and also has a quadratic form 
𝐻(𝐼𝑡
𝑑) =
1
2
ℎ(𝐼𝑡
𝑑 − 𝐼?̅? − 𝜀𝑡
𝑑)
2
, ℎ > 0.  The holding cost is the difference between the direct cost of 
holding inventories of the commodity which is increasing and convex in 𝐼𝑡
𝑑, and the benefit of 
carrying a larger inventory which reduces the probability of stockout and the loss of customers.   
With the quadratic holding cost, a CARA utility function, and normally distributed spot 
price, we can maximize: 
𝐸𝑡(𝑠𝑡+1)𝐼𝑡
𝑑 − 𝜌𝑠𝑡𝐼𝑡
𝑑 −
1
2
ℎ(𝐼𝑡
𝑑 − 𝐼?̅? − 𝜀𝑡
𝑑)
2
−
1
2
𝑟𝑑𝑉𝑡(𝑠𝑡+1)𝐼𝑡
2 (13) 
Taking the partial derivative with respect to 𝐼𝑡
𝑑 yields the optimal inventory, 
𝐼𝑡
𝑑 =
ℎ(𝐼?̅? + 𝜀𝑡
𝑑) + 𝐸𝑡𝑠𝑡+1 − 𝜌𝑠𝑡
ℎ + 𝑟𝑑𝑉𝑡𝑠𝑡+1
(14) 
which depends positively on the target level of inventory 𝐼?̅? + 𝜀𝑡
𝑑, and the expected capital gain of 
holding a unit of a commodity 𝐸𝑡𝑠𝑡+1 − 𝜌𝑠𝑡.  It depends negatively on the holding cost coefficient 
ℎ, the risk aversion coefficient 𝑟𝑑, and the spot price variance 𝑉𝑡𝑠𝑡+1. Inventory carrying cost allows 
for the “convenience yield” for a small level of inventory (𝐼𝑡
𝑑 < 𝐼?̅? + 𝜀𝑡
𝑑) so that when the expected 
capital gain is negative (𝐸𝑡𝑠𝑡+1 − 𝜌𝑠𝑡 < 0), a positive quantity of stocks can be held due to the 
convenience of holding physical stocks.  The possibility of negative inventory exists but we assume 
it is not probable due to high convenience yield for carrying commodities forward through time.  
When we add the possibility of futures trading the inventory holding dealer can enter into 
one period ahead futures contracts to get a profit function of, 
Π𝑡+1
𝑑∗ = 𝑠𝑡+1𝐼𝑡
𝑑∗ − 𝜌𝑠𝑡𝐼𝑡
𝑑∗ − 𝐻(𝐼𝑡
𝑑∗) + 𝑅𝑡
𝑑(𝑠𝑡+1 − 𝑓𝑡) (15) 
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with 𝑅𝑡
𝑑 being the quantity of futures contracts purchased or sold.  Thus, like the producer, the 
inventory holding dealer can maximize expected utility by maximizing, 
𝐸𝑡(𝑠𝑡+1)𝐼𝑡
𝑑∗ − 𝜌𝑠𝑡𝐼𝑡
𝑑∗ −
1
2
ℎ(𝐼𝑡
𝑑∗ − 𝐼?̅? − 𝜀𝑡
𝑑)
2
+ 𝐸𝑡(𝑠𝑡+1)𝑅𝑡
𝑑 − 𝑅𝑡
𝑑𝑓𝑡 
−
1
2
𝑟𝑑(𝐼𝑡
𝑑 + 𝑅𝑡
𝑑)
2
𝑉𝑡(𝑠𝑡+1) (16) 
which gives us the optimal futures contracts and optimal inventory demand: 
𝑅𝑡
𝑑 = −𝐼𝑡
𝑑∗ + 𝑍𝑡
𝑑 (17a) 
where, 
𝑍𝑡
𝑑 =
𝐸𝑡𝑠𝑡+1 − 𝑓𝑡
𝑟𝑑𝑉𝑡𝑠𝑡+1
(17b) 
and,  
𝐼𝑡
𝑑∗ = 𝐼?̅? + 𝜀𝑡
𝑑 +
𝑓𝑡 − 𝜌𝑠𝑡
ℎ
(17c) 
The optimal futures position is again separated into a hedging component and a speculative 
component like the producer.  It is determined by the opposite inventory decision, the expected spot 
price, futures price, risk aversion coefficient, and the variance of spot price.  Optimal inventory 
depends on the current spot price, futures price, the discount factor, and the holding cost parameters. 
3.1.4. Pure Speculator 
When futures trading is introduced, it is possible that agents without underlying cash 
positions may enter the futures market in the hopes of obtaining profits.  We would categorize these 
agents as pure speculators; the pure designation is used to indicate they are speculating on the price 
movements and not making any commitments to the physical commodity market.  Because we 
assume futures trading to be costless (no transaction costs, no capital outlays, and no margin 
requirements) the size of a futures position is not subject to the speculator’s capital constraints.  The 
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objective of the risk-averse pure speculator “s” is to maximize their expected utility 𝐸𝑡𝑈
𝑠(Π𝑡+1
𝑠 ) 
where their profit function can be represented by: 
Πt+1
𝑠 = 𝑍𝑡
𝑠(𝑠𝑡+1 − 𝑓𝑡) (18) 
Under CARA (with risk aversion coefficient 𝑟𝑠) and normally distributed spot prices the 
pure speculator is maximizing: 
𝐸𝑡(𝑠𝑡+1)𝑍𝑡
𝑠 − 𝑍𝑡
𝑠𝑓𝑡 −
1
2
𝑟𝑠(𝑍𝑡
𝑠)2𝑉𝑡𝑠𝑡+1 (19) 
Maximization yields the optimal volume of speculation, 
𝑍𝑡
𝑠 =
𝐸𝑡𝑠𝑡+1 − 𝑓𝑡
𝑟𝑠𝑉𝑡𝑠𝑡+1
(20) 
which is similar to the speculative component of both the producer and dealers’ optimal futures 
positions except for the individual risk aversion characteristics.  
3.2. Determining Spot and Futures Prices 
3.2.1. Commodity Markets without Futures Trading 
We can now determine the equilibrium prices by taking all individual agents supply and 
demand behaviors together.  We assume homogeneity between agents within groups; i.e., 
consumers are similar with respect to their demand coefficients and disturbances, producers have 
identical cost functions and risk aversion coefficients, dealers have identical holding costs and risk 
aversion coefficients, and pure speculators have the same risk attitudes. Producers, dealers, and 
pure speculators have rational expectations in the sense of Muth (1961), which is to say they utilize 
all available market information to form expectations about the next period spot price.  Information 
is symmetric among agents.  
The scenario of no futures market is considered first.  We can aggregate consumer demand, 
production quantity, and inventory demand equations over a fixed number of agents. 
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𝐶𝑡 = 𝛼0 − 𝛼𝑠𝑡 + 𝑢𝑡 (21a) 
𝑄𝑡 =
1
𝜌
𝛽 +
𝜃
𝜐
(𝐸𝑡−1𝑠𝑡 +
𝜌
𝛽
𝜐𝑡−1) (21b) 
𝐼𝑡 =
1
1
𝛾 +
𝜃
𝑣
(
1
𝛾
𝐼 ̅ + 𝐸𝑡𝑠𝑡+1 − 𝜌𝑠𝑡 +
1
𝛾
𝑤𝑡) (21c) 
𝑄𝑡 + 𝐼𝑡−1 = 𝐶𝑡 + 𝐼𝑡 (21d) 
where 𝛼0, 𝛼, 𝛽, 𝜐, 𝛾, 𝑣, 𝐼,̅ 𝜃, 𝑢𝑡 , 𝜐𝑡, and 𝑤𝑡 are defined as, 
𝛼0 = 𝑛
𝑖𝑎0, 𝛼 = 𝑛
𝑖𝑎, 𝛽 =
𝑛𝑝
𝑔
, 𝜐 =
𝑛𝑝
𝑟𝑝
, 𝛾 =
𝑛𝑑
ℎ
, 𝑣 =
𝑛𝑑
𝑟𝑑
, (21e)   
𝐼 ̅ = 𝑛𝑑𝐼?̅?, 𝜃 = 𝑉𝑡𝑠𝑡+1, 𝑢𝑡 = 𝑛
𝑖𝜀𝑡
𝑖 , 𝜐𝑡 = −𝑛
𝑝𝜀𝑡
𝑝, 𝑤𝑡 = 𝑛
𝑑𝜀𝑡
𝑑 , 
where the fixed number of consumers, producers, and dealers are 𝑛𝑖, 𝑛𝑝, and 𝑛𝑑.  The sources of 
stochastic prices are the disturbances 𝑢𝑡, 𝜐𝑡−1, and 𝑤𝑡 in equations (21a), (21b), and (21c), (𝑢𝑡, 
𝜐𝑡−1, and 𝑤𝑡 are data at time 𝑡 and thereafter).  We assume 𝑢𝑡, 𝜐𝑡, and 𝑤𝑡 are all pairwise 
uncorrelated and serially independent with means 0 and variances 𝜎𝑢
2, 𝜎𝜐
2, and 𝜎𝑤
2 .  The random 
variables assumed serial independence makes 𝑉𝑡𝑠𝑡+1 independent of time and allows us to treat 𝜃 
as a constant. 
When we substitute the aggregated equations (21a), (21b), and (21c) into the spot market 
clearing equation (21d), some algebraic manipulation yields: 
−
1
1
𝛾 +
𝜃
𝑣
(𝐸𝑡𝑠𝑡+1 − 𝜌𝑠𝑡 − 𝐸𝑡−1𝑠𝑡 + 𝜌𝑠𝑡−1) + 𝛼𝑠𝑡 +
1
𝜌
𝛽 +
𝜃
𝜐
(𝐸𝑡−1𝑠𝑡)
= −
1
𝜌
𝛽 +
𝜃
𝜐
(
𝜌
𝛽
𝜐𝑡−1) −
1
1
𝛾 +
𝜃
𝑣
[
1
𝛾
(𝑤𝑡−1 − 𝑤𝑡)] + 𝛼0 + 𝑢𝑡                                         (22) 
Multiplying both sides by −(
1
𝛾
+
𝜃
𝑣
) and manipulating yields equation (23): 
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𝐸𝑡𝑠𝑡+1 − [𝜌 + 𝛼 (
1
𝛾
+
𝜃
𝑣
)] 𝑠𝑡 − [1 +
1
𝛾 +
𝜃
𝑣
𝜌
𝛽 +
𝜃
𝜐
] 𝐸𝑡−1𝑠𝑡 + 𝜌𝑠𝑡−1         
                 = −(
1
𝛾
+
𝜃
𝑣
) (𝛼0 + 𝑢𝑡) +
𝜌
𝛽
(
1
𝛾 +
𝜃
𝑣
𝜌
𝛽 +
𝜃
𝜐
)𝜐𝑡−1 −
1
𝛾
(𝑤𝑡 − 𝑤𝑡−1) (23) 
Since we are operating in a rational expectation’s framework, market participants know that the 
relationships in (23) always hold.  The conditional expectations operator 𝐸𝑡−1 applied to both sides 
of (23), with the assumption 𝐸𝑡−1𝑢𝑡 = 𝐸𝑡−1𝑤𝑡 = 0 yields, 
𝐸𝑡−1[𝑠𝑡+1 − (1 + 𝜌 + 𝜙)𝑠𝑡 + 𝜌𝑠𝑡−1] = 𝐸𝑡−1 [− (
1
𝛾
+
𝜃
𝑣
)𝛼0 +
𝜌
𝛽
(
1
𝛾
+
𝜃
𝑣
𝜌
𝛽
+
𝜃
𝜐
) 𝜐𝑡−1 +
1
𝛾
𝑤𝑡−1] (24a)  
where 𝜙 is defined as 
𝜙 = (𝛼 +
1
𝜌
𝛽 +
𝜃
𝜐
)(
1
𝛾
+
𝜃
𝑣
) > 0 (24b) 
Applying the lag operator 𝐿 (where 𝐿𝑘𝑠𝑡 = 𝑠𝑡−𝑘) to the term in the square brackets on the left hand 
side of equation (9a), [𝑠𝑡+1 − (1 + 𝜌 + 𝜙)𝑠𝑡 + 𝜌𝑠𝑡−1], yields, 
𝐿−1[1 − (1 + 𝜌 + 𝜙)𝐿 + 𝜌𝐿2]𝑠𝑡 (24c) 
We let 𝜙 have the form, 
𝜙 =
(𝜌 − 𝜆)(1 − 𝜆)
𝜆
(25) 
where 𝜆 satisfies the restriction 0 < 𝜆 < 1 <
𝜌
𝜆
.  Factoring (24c), we can obtain the following: 
𝐿−1 [1 − (1 + 𝜌 +
(𝜌 − 𝜆)(1 − 𝜆)
𝜆
)𝐿 + 𝜌𝐿2] 𝑠𝑡 = 𝐿
−1 (1 −
𝜌
𝜆
𝐿) (1 − 𝜆𝐿)𝑠𝑡
= −
𝜌
𝜆
(1 −
𝜆
𝜌
𝐿−1) (1 − 𝜆𝐿)𝑠𝑡                                                                                        (26) 
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Recalling the general geometric series representation 
1
1−𝑥
= ∑ 𝑥𝑘∞𝑘=0 , we can divide both sides of 
(24a) by −
𝜌
𝜆
(1 −
𝜆
𝜌
𝐿−1) to get:  
𝐸𝑡−1(1 − 𝜆𝐿)𝑠𝑡 = 𝐸𝑡−1 [
1
𝛾
+
𝜃
𝑣
𝜌
𝜆
−1
𝛼0 −
𝜆
𝛽
(
1
𝛾
+
𝜃
𝑣
𝜌
𝛽
+
𝜃
𝜐
)∑ (
𝜆
𝜌
)
𝑗
𝜐𝑡−1+𝑗 −
𝜆
𝛾𝜌
∑ (
𝜆
𝜌
)
𝑗
𝑤𝑡−1+𝑗 + 𝜀𝑡
∞
𝑗=0
∞
𝑗=0 ] (27)  
The process 𝐸𝑡−1𝜀𝑡 =
𝜌
𝜆
𝜀𝑡−1 is denoted by 𝜀𝑡, which is explosive except for the case when 𝜀𝑡 = 0.  
For 𝜀𝑡 = 0, we can eliminate speculative bubbles and ensure a unique path for 𝐸𝑡−1𝑠𝑡.  For 𝑗 > 0, 
𝐸𝑡−1𝑣𝑡−1+𝑗 = 𝐸𝑡−1𝑤𝑡−1+𝑗 = 0.  Thus, letting 𝜀𝑡 = 0, 𝑗 = 0, and solving for 𝐸𝑡−1𝑠𝑡 yields, 
𝐸𝑡−1𝑠𝑡 =
1
𝛾 +
𝜃
𝑣
𝜌
𝜆 − 1
𝛼0 + 𝜆𝑠𝑡−1 −
𝜆
𝛽
(
1
𝛾 +
𝜃
𝑣
𝜌
𝛽 +
𝜃
𝜐
)𝜐𝑡−1 −
𝜆
𝛾𝜌
𝑤𝑡−1 (28) 
We can move (28) ahead one period to obtain 𝐸𝑡𝑠𝑡+1: 
𝐸𝑡𝑠𝑡+1 =
1
𝛾 +
𝜃
𝑣
𝜌
𝜆 − 1
𝛼0 + 𝜆𝑠𝑡 −
𝜆
𝛽
(
1
𝛾 +
𝜃
𝑣
𝜌
𝛽 +
𝜃
𝜐
)𝜐𝑡 −
𝜆
𝛾𝜌
𝑤𝑡 (29) 
Working towards the rational expectation’s equilibrium solution for spot price, we substitute (29) 
into (23) which yields: 
1
𝛾
+
𝜃
𝑣
𝜌
𝜆
−1
𝛼0 + 𝜆𝑠𝑡 −
𝜆
𝛽
(
1
𝛾
+
𝜃
𝑣
𝜌
𝛽
+
𝜃
𝜐
)𝜐𝑡 −
𝜆
𝛾𝜌
𝑤𝑡 − [𝜌 + 𝛼 (
1
𝛾
+
𝜃
𝑣
)] 𝑠𝑡 − [1 +
1
𝛾
+
𝜃
𝑣
𝜌
𝛽
+
𝜃
𝜐
] 𝐸𝑡−1𝑠𝑡 + 𝜌𝑠𝑡−1  
= −(
1
𝛾
+
𝜃
𝑣
) (𝛼0 + 𝑢𝑡) +
𝜌
𝛽
(
1
𝛾
+
𝜃
𝑣
𝜌
𝛽
+
𝜃
𝜐
)𝜐𝑡−1 −
1
𝛾
(𝑤𝑡 − 𝑤𝑡−1) (30)  
Manipulating (30) we can obtain, 
[𝜌 − 𝜆 + 𝛼 (
1
𝛾
+
𝜃
𝑣
)] 𝑠𝑡 = −[1 +
1
𝛾
+
𝜃
𝑣
𝜌
𝛽
+
𝜃
𝜐
] 𝐸𝑡−1𝑠𝑡 + 𝜌𝑠𝑡−1 + (
1
𝛾
+
𝜃
𝑣
) (𝛼0 + 𝑢𝑡) −
𝜌
𝛽
(
1
𝛾
+
𝜃
𝑣
𝜌
𝛽
+
𝜃
𝜐
) 𝜐𝑡−1  
+
1
𝛾
(𝑤𝑡 − 𝑤𝑡−1) +
1
𝛾
+
𝜃
𝑣
𝜌
𝜆
−1
𝛼0 −
𝜆
𝛽
(
1
𝛾
+
𝜃
𝑣
𝜌
𝛽
+
𝜃
𝜐
) 𝜐𝑡 −
𝜆
𝛾𝜌
𝑤𝑡 (31)  
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Substituting (28) into (31), dividing both sides by [𝜌 − 𝜆 + 𝛼 (
1
𝛾
+
𝜃
𝑣
)], and simplifying allows us 
to obtain, 
𝑠𝑡 = [
1
𝜌 − 𝜆 + 𝛼 (
1
𝛾 +
𝜃
𝑣)
(
𝜌
𝜆
− 1 −
1
𝛾 +
𝜃
𝑣
𝜌
𝛽 +
𝜃
𝜐
)]
1
𝛾 +
𝜃
𝑣
𝜌
𝜆 − 1
𝛼0
+ [
1
𝜌 − 𝜆 + 𝛼 (
1
𝛾 +
𝜃
𝑣)
(
𝜌
𝜆
− 1 −
1
𝛾 +
𝜃
𝑣
𝜌
𝛽 +
𝜃
𝜐
)] 𝜆𝑠𝑡−1 +
1
𝜌 − 𝜆 + 𝛼 (
1
𝛾 +
𝜃
𝑣)
(
1
𝛾
+
𝜃
𝑣
) 𝑢𝑡
−
𝜆
𝛽 (
𝜌
𝛽 +
𝜃
𝜐)
[
1
𝜌 − 𝜆 + 𝛼 (
1
𝛾 +
𝜃
𝑣)
(
1
𝛾
+
𝜃
𝑣
) 𝜐𝑡
+ {
1
𝜌 − 𝜆 + 𝛼 (
1
𝛾 +
𝜃
𝑣)
(
𝜌
𝜆
− 1 −
1
𝛾 +
𝜃
𝑣
𝜌
𝛽 +
𝜃
𝜐
)} (
1
𝛾
+
𝜃
𝑣
) 𝜐𝑡−1]
+
1
𝜌
[
𝜌 − 𝜆
𝛾
𝜌 − 𝜆 + 𝛼 (
1
𝛾 +
𝜃
𝑣)
𝑤𝑡
− {
1
𝜌 − 𝜆 + 𝛼 (
1
𝛾 +
𝜃
𝑣)
(
𝜌
𝜆
− 1 −
1
𝛾 +
𝜃
𝑣
𝜌
𝛽 +
𝜃
𝜐
)}
𝜆
𝛾
𝑤𝑡−1]                                                  (32) 
Letting 𝜂 =
𝜌−𝜆
𝛾(
1
𝛾
+
𝜃
𝑣
)
 gives us: 
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𝑠𝑡 = [
1
𝜌 − 𝜆 + 𝛼 (
1
𝛾 +
𝜃
𝑣)
(
𝜌
𝜆
− 1 −
1
𝛾 +
𝜃
𝑣
𝜌
𝛽 +
𝜃
𝜐
)]
1
𝛾 +
𝜃
𝑣
𝜌
𝜆 − 1
𝛼0
+ [
1
𝜌 − 𝜆 + 𝛼 (
1
𝛾 +
𝜃
𝑣)
(
𝜌
𝜆
− 1 −
1
𝛾 +
𝜃
𝑣
𝜌
𝛽 +
𝜃
𝜐
)] 𝜆𝑠𝑡−1 +
1
𝛼 + 𝛾𝜂
𝑢𝑡
−
𝜆
𝛽 (
𝜌
𝛽 +
𝜃
𝜐)
[
1
𝛼 + 𝛾𝜂
𝜐𝑡 + {
1
𝜌 − 𝜆 + 𝛼 (
1
𝛾 +
𝜃
𝑣)
(
𝜌
𝜆
− 1 −
1
𝛾 +
𝜃
𝑣
𝜌
𝛽 +
𝜃
𝜐
)}(
1
𝛾
+
𝜃
𝑣
) 𝜐𝑡−1] 
+
1
𝜌
[
𝜂
𝛼 + 𝛾𝜂
𝑤𝑡 − {
1
𝜌 − 𝜆 + 𝛼 (
1
𝛾 +
𝜃
𝑣)
(
𝜌
𝜆
− 1 −
1
𝛾 +
𝜃
𝑣
𝜌
𝛽 +
𝜃
𝜐
)}
𝜆
𝛾
𝑤𝑡−1] (33a) 
Now setting ?̅? =
1
1
𝛾
+
𝜃
𝑣
 − 
𝜆
(𝜌−𝜆)(
𝜌
𝛽
+
𝜃
𝜐
)
𝛼+𝜆
1
𝜌
𝛽
+
𝜃
𝜐
𝛼0, and simplifying (33a) yields, 
𝑠𝑡 = ?̅? +
1
𝛼+𝛾𝜂
(∑ 𝜆𝑗 [
1
𝜌−𝜆+𝛼(
1
𝛾
+
𝜃
𝑣
)
(
𝜌
𝜆
− 1 −
1
𝛾
+
𝜃
𝑣
𝜌
𝛽
+
𝜃
𝜐
)]
𝑗
∞
𝑗=0 𝑢𝑡−𝑗 −
1
𝛽(
𝜌
𝛽
+
𝜃
𝜐
)
[𝜆𝜐𝑡 + {𝛼 (
1
𝛾
+
𝜃
𝑣
) + 𝜌} ⋅
∑ 𝜆𝑗∞𝑗=1 [
1
𝜌−𝜆+𝛼(
1
𝛾
+
𝜃
𝑣
)
(
𝜌
𝜆
− 1 −
1
𝛾
+
𝜃
𝑣
𝜌
𝛽
+
𝜃
𝜐
)]
𝑗
𝜐𝑡−𝑗] +
1
𝜌
(𝜂𝑤𝑡 − {
𝛼
𝛾
} ⋅ ∑ 𝜆𝑗∞𝑗=1 [
1
𝜌−𝜆+𝛼(
1
𝛾
+
𝜃
𝑣
)
(
𝜌
𝜆
− 1 −
1
𝛾
+
𝜃
𝑣
𝜌
𝛽
+
𝜃
𝜐
)]
𝑗
𝑤𝑡−𝑗))                                                                                                                                   (33b)  
Thus, we have the rational expectations equilibrium spot price.  Previously, we assumed normal 
random prices.  We can see that 𝑠𝑡 is normally distributed if 𝑢𝑡 , 𝜐𝑡, and 𝑤𝑡 are also normally 
distributed, confirming the previous assumption.  To get the equilibrium excepted spot price (34) 
and variance (35) T periods forward, which is conditional on information at time t, we can lead 
(33b) forward 𝑇 periods, for 𝑇 ≥ 1: 
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𝐸𝑡𝑠𝑡+𝑇 = ?̅? +
1
𝛼+𝛾𝜂
{𝜆𝑇 [
1
𝜌−𝜆+𝛼(
1
𝛾
+
𝜃
𝑣
)
(
𝜌
𝜆
− 1 −
1
𝛾
+
𝜃
𝑣
𝜌
𝛽
+
𝜃
𝜐
)]
𝑇
} ⋅ (∑ 𝜆𝑗∞𝑗=0 [
1
𝜌−𝜆+𝛼(
1
𝛾
+
𝜃
𝑣
)
(
𝜌
𝜆
− 1 −
1
𝛾
+
𝜃
𝑣
𝜌
𝛽
+
𝜃
𝜐
)]
𝑗
⋅
𝑢𝑡−𝑗 −
𝛼(
1
𝛾
+
𝜃
𝑣
)+𝜌
𝛽(
𝜌
𝛽
+
𝜃
𝜐
)
⋅ ∑ 𝜆𝑗∞𝑗=0 [
1
𝜌−𝜆+𝛼(
1
𝛾
+
𝜃
𝑣
)
(
𝜌
𝜆
− 1 −
1
𝛾
+
𝜃
𝑣
𝜌
𝛽
+
𝜃
𝜐
)]
𝑗
⋅ 𝜐𝑡−𝑗 −
𝛼
𝛾𝜌
⋅
∑ 𝜆𝑗∞𝑗=0 [
1
𝜌−𝜆+𝛼(
1
𝛾
+
𝜃
𝑣
)
(
𝜌
𝜆
− 1 −
1
𝛾
+
𝜃
𝑣
𝜌
𝛽
+
𝜃
𝜐
)]
𝑗
⋅ 𝑤𝑡−𝑗)                                                                      (34)  
 
𝑉𝑡𝑠𝑡+𝑇 = (
1
𝛼+𝛾𝜂
)
2
⋅
(
 
 
1−𝜆2𝑇[
1
𝜌−𝜆+𝛼(
1
𝛾
+
𝜃
𝑣
)
(
𝜌
𝜆
−1−
1
𝛾
+
𝜃
𝑣
𝜌
𝛽
+
𝜃
𝜐
)]
2𝑇
1−𝜆2[
1
𝜌−𝜆+𝛼(
1
𝛾
+
𝜃
𝑣
)
(
𝜌
𝜆
−1−
1
𝛾
+
𝜃
𝑣
𝜌
𝛽
+
𝜃
𝜐
)]
2 𝜎𝑢
2 +
1
𝛽2(
𝜌
𝛽
+
𝜃
𝜐
)
2
[
 
 
 
 
{𝜌 − 𝛾𝜂 (
1
𝛾
+
𝜃
𝑣
)}
2
+ {𝛼 (
1
𝛾
+
𝜃
𝑣
) + 𝜌}
2
𝜆2[
1
𝜌−𝜆+𝛼(
1
𝛾
+
𝜃
𝑣
)
(
𝜌
𝜆
−1−
1
𝛾
+
𝜃
𝑣
𝜌
𝛽
+
𝜃
𝜐
)]
2
−𝜆2𝑇[
1
𝜌−𝜆+𝛼(
1
𝛾
+
𝜃
𝑣
)
(
𝜌
𝜆
−1−
1
𝛾
+
𝜃
𝑣
𝜌
𝛽
+
𝜃
𝜐
)]
2𝑇
1−𝜆2[
1
𝜌−𝜆+𝛼(
1
𝛾
+
𝜃
𝑣
)
(
𝜌
𝜆
−1−
1
𝛾
+
𝜃
𝑣
𝜌
𝛽
+
𝜃
𝜐
)]
2
]
 
 
 
 
𝜎𝑣
2 +
[
 
 
 
 
(
𝜂
𝜌
)
2
+ (
𝛼
𝛾𝜂
)
2
⋅
𝜆2[
1
𝜌−𝜆+𝛼(
1
𝛾
+
𝜃
𝑣
)
(
𝜌
𝜆
−1−
1
𝛾
+
𝜃
𝑣
𝜌
𝛽
+
𝜃
𝜐
)]
2
−𝜆2𝑇[
1
𝜌−𝜆+𝛼(
1
𝛾
+
𝜃
𝑣
)
(
𝜌
𝜆
−1−
1
𝛾
+
𝜃
𝑣
𝜌
𝛽
+
𝜃
𝜐
)]
2𝑇
1−𝜆2[
1
𝜌−𝜆+𝛼(
1
𝛾
+
𝜃
𝑣
)
(
𝜌
𝜆
−1−
1
𝛾
+
𝜃
𝑣
𝜌
𝛽
+
𝜃
𝜐
)]
2
]
 
 
 
 
𝜎𝑤
2
)
 
 
                                               (35)  
 
3.2.2. Commodity Markets with Futures Trading 
When we introduce the possibility of futures trading, commodity producers and inventory 
holding dealers may have their decisions altered by the ability to enter into forward contracts to 
maximize expected utility.  Futures trading also makes it possible for pure speculators to enter the 
market to maximize their utility.  Like before, we can aggregate consumer demand (36a), 
production (36b), and inventory demand (36c) over a fixed number of agents as well as aggregated 
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futures speculation (36d).  We also have the overall spot market clearing (36e) and futures market 
clearing condition’s (36f): 
𝐶𝑡
∗ = 𝛼0 − 𝛼𝑠𝑡
∗ + 𝑢𝑡 (36a) 
𝑄𝑡
∗ =
𝛽
𝜌
𝑓𝑡−1 + 𝜐𝑡−1 (36b) 
𝐼𝑡
∗ = 𝐼̅ + 𝛾(𝑓𝑡 − 𝜌𝑠𝑡
∗) + 𝑤𝑡 (36c) 
𝑍𝑡 =
𝜒
𝜃∗
(𝐸𝑡𝑠𝑡+1
∗ − 𝑓𝑡) (36d) 
𝑍𝑡−1 = 𝐶𝑡
∗ + 𝐼𝑡
∗ (36e) 
𝑄𝑡+1
∗ + 𝐼𝑡
∗ = 𝑍𝑡 (36f) 
where 𝑠𝑡
∗ is the spot price in the presence of a futures market and 𝜒 and 𝜃∗are defined as:  
𝜒 = 𝜐 + 𝑣 + 𝜔, 𝜔 =
𝑛𝑠
𝑟𝑠
, 𝜃∗ = 𝑉𝑡𝑠𝑡+1
∗ , (36g) 
We defined 𝛼0, 𝛼, 𝛽, 𝜐, 𝛾, 𝑣, and 𝐼  ̅in (21e), stated again: 
𝛼0 = 𝑛
𝑖𝑎0, 𝛼 = 𝑛
𝑖𝑎, 𝛽 =
𝑛𝑝
𝑔
, 𝜐 =
𝑛𝑝
𝑟𝑝
, 𝛾 =
𝑛𝑑
ℎ
, 𝑣 =
𝑛𝑑
𝑟𝑑
, 𝐼 ̅ = 𝑛𝑑𝐼?̅? 
Here, 𝑛𝑠is defined as the fixed number of pure speculators.  Proceeding in a similar fashion 
as before, we will see that in general, the conditional variance of spot price in the presence of a 
futures market, 𝜃∗, is different than the conditional variance of spot price without a futures market, 
𝜃.  We will also see that 𝜃∗ is independent of time when we assume 𝑢𝑡, 𝜐𝑡, and 𝑤𝑡 have constant 
variance (𝜎𝑢
2, 𝜎𝜐
2, and 𝜎𝑤
2 ).   
Consumer demand (36a) is identical to before. Summing (11c) and (17c) over identical 
agents gives us the production (36b) and inventory demand (36c) equations.  We can see that unlike 
before [eq. (21b) and (21c)], production and inventory demand do not depend on price uncertainty.  
We showed previously there are speculative components in the futures contract decisions for 
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producers and inventory holding dealers. Thus, to obtain the market demand for futures speculation 
(36d), we must aggregate the speculative demand of producers, inventory holding dealers, as well 
as that of pure speculators: 𝑍𝑡
𝑝, 𝑍𝑡
𝑑, and 𝑍𝑡
𝑠.    
The amount purchased by speculators (to include pure speculators as well as the speculative 
activities of producers and dealers) in one period, say 𝑡 − 1, does not appear until the next period, 
𝑡.  Since producers and dealers are committed as hedgers in period 𝑡 − 1 for delivery in period 𝑡, 
only speculators have a supply of spot commodities for sale in time 𝑡.  We get the spot market 
clearing condition (36e) since speculators are the only agents with a supply of spot commodities 
for sale and consumers and dealers are the only agents who demand the spot commodities.  
For the futures market clearing condition, we see that the supply of futures contracts is made 
up of the producers and dealers hedging activities, 𝑄𝑡+1
∗ + 𝐼𝑡
∗.  That is equal to the futures contracts 
demanded by speculators, 𝑍𝑡.  Thus, we have: 
𝑄𝑡+1
∗ + 𝐼𝑡
∗ = 𝑍𝑡 =
𝜒
𝜃∗
(𝐸𝑡𝑠𝑡+1
∗ − 𝑓𝑡),
𝜒
𝜃∗
≥ 0 (37) 
Therefore, we can see that 𝐸𝑡𝑠𝑡+1
∗ − 𝑓𝑡 and 𝑄𝑡+1
∗ + 𝐼𝑡
∗ must have the same sign.  Since hedgers are 
likely to take a net short position (𝑄𝑡+1
∗ + 𝐼𝑡
∗ > 0 as long as 𝐼𝑡
∗ > 0), the expected gain on the price 
movements (𝐸𝑡𝑠𝑡+1
∗ − 𝑓𝑡 > 0) will compel speculators to take a net long position (𝑍𝑡 > 0). 
Speculators take net long positions when the expected future spot price is greater than the current 
futures price. We can see that this corresponds to the case of a market in normal backwardation.  
Normal backwardation is the belief that futures prices tend to rise over the life of a contract due to 
the desire of hedgers to collectively be net short (Kolb and Overdahl 2006). Hence, we can only 
have contango when there is a short stock of inventory.  Contango is the belief that prices tend to 
fall over the life of a contract, occurring when hedgers are net long with futures prices above the 
expected future spot price (Kolb and Overdahl 2006). Thus, the futures market allows hedgers to 
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be insured by speculators where hedgers pay an insurance price, or risk premium, of 𝐸𝑡𝑠𝑡+1
∗ − 𝑓𝑡 to 
the speculators to accept the risk of open positions.  
To obtain the physical resource constraint, we can lag the futures market clearing condition 
(36f) by one period, substitute the spot market clearing conditions (36e) and manipulate the 
expression to obtain:  
𝑄𝑡
∗ = 𝐶𝑡
∗ + (𝐼𝑡
∗ − 𝐼𝑡−1
∗ ) (38) 
This tells us that the quantity produced is expended by consumer demand and the change in 
inventory.   
Toward finding the rational expectations equilibrium spot and futures price, we can begin 
by substituting 𝑄𝑡+1
∗  (36b moved ahead one period), 𝐼𝑡
∗, and 𝑍𝑡 into (36f): 
𝑓𝑡 =
1
𝛽
𝜌 + 𝛾 +
𝜒
𝜃∗
(−𝐼 ̅ +
𝜒
𝜃∗
𝐸𝑡𝑠𝑡+1
∗ + 𝛾𝜌𝑠𝑡
∗ − 𝜐𝑡 −𝑤𝑡) (39) 
Lagging (39) by one period and then substituting into (36d) also lagged by one period yields: 
𝑍𝑡−1 =
𝜒
𝜃∗
[𝐸𝑡−1𝑠𝑡
∗ −
1
𝛽
𝜌 + 𝛾 +
𝜒
𝜃∗
(−𝐼 ̅ +
𝜒
𝜃∗
𝐸𝑡−1𝑠𝑡
∗ + 𝛾𝜌𝑠𝑡−1
∗ − 𝜐𝑡−1 − 𝑤𝑡−1)] (40) 
 
Substituting (36a) and (36c) into (36e) yields, 
𝑍𝑡−1 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼𝑠𝑡
∗ + 𝑢𝑡 + 𝐼̅ + 𝛾(𝑓𝑡 − 𝜌𝑠𝑡
∗) + 𝑤𝑡 (41) 
and substituting (39) into (41) gives us: 
𝑍𝑡−1 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼𝑠𝑡
∗ + 𝑢𝑡 + 𝐼̅ + 𝛾 [
1
𝛽
𝜌
+𝛾+
𝜒
𝜃∗
(−𝐼 ̅ +
𝜒
𝜃∗
𝐸𝑡𝑠𝑡+1
∗ + 𝛾𝜌𝑠𝑡
∗ − 𝜐𝑡 − 𝑤𝑡) − 𝜌𝑠𝑡
∗] + 𝑤𝑡 (42)  
Setting (42) equal to (40) and manipulating yields: 
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𝜒
𝜃∗
[𝐸𝑡−1𝑠𝑡
∗ −
1
𝛽
𝜌 + 𝛾 +
𝜒
𝜃∗
(−𝐼 ̅ +
𝜒
𝜃∗
𝐸𝑡−1𝑠𝑡
∗ + 𝛾𝜌𝑠𝑡−1
∗ − 𝜐𝑡−1 − 𝑤𝑡−1)]
= 𝛼0 + 𝛼𝑠𝑡
∗ + 𝑢𝑡 + 𝐼̅
+ 𝛾 [
1
𝛽
𝜌 + 𝛾 +
𝜒
𝜃∗
(−𝐼 ̅ +
𝜒
𝜃∗
𝐸𝑡𝑠𝑡+1
∗ + 𝛾𝜌𝑠𝑡
∗ − 𝜐𝑡 − 𝑤𝑡) − 𝜌𝑠𝑡
∗] + 𝑤𝑡                               (43) 
Continued manipulating gives us: 
𝐸𝑡𝑠𝑡+1
∗ − [𝜌 + 𝛼 {
1
𝛾
+ (1 +
𝛽
𝛾𝜌
)
𝜃∗
𝜒
} + 𝛽
𝜃∗
𝜒
] 𝑠𝑡
∗ − (1 +
𝛽
𝛾𝜌
)𝐸𝑡−1𝑠𝑡
∗ + 𝜌𝑠𝑡−1
∗
= −
𝛽
𝛾𝜌
⋅
𝜃∗
𝜒
𝐼 ̅ − {
1
𝛾
+ (1 +
𝛽
𝛾𝜌
)
𝜃∗
𝜒
} (𝛼0 + 𝑢𝑡)
+
𝜃∗
𝜒
𝜐𝑡 +
1
𝛾
𝜐𝑡−1 −
1
𝛾
{(1 +
𝛽
𝜌
⋅
𝜃∗
𝜒
)𝑤𝑡 − 𝑤𝑡−1}                                                              (44) 
We can see that (44) has different coefficients but takes a similar form to the stochastic difference 
equation in the absence of futures trading, i.e., equation (23).  Thus, the magnitude of the 
coefficients is changed when futures trading is introduced.  
We employ the same procedure to obtain the rational expectations spot price in the presence 
of futures markets: 
𝑠𝑡
∗ = ?̅?∗ +
1
𝛼+𝛾𝜂∗
(∑ 𝜆∗𝑗∞𝑗=0 [
1
𝜌−𝜆∗+𝛼{
1
𝛾
+(1+
𝛽
𝛾𝜌
)
𝜃∗
𝜒
}+𝛽
𝜃∗
𝜒
(
𝜌
𝜆∗
− 1 −
𝛽
𝛾𝜌
)]
𝑗
⋅ 𝑢𝑡−𝑗 − (
𝜌−𝜂∗
𝜌
) 𝜐𝑡 − (1 +
𝛼
𝛾𝜌
)∑ 𝜆∗𝑗∞𝑗=1 [
1
𝜌−𝜆∗+𝛼{
1
𝛾
+(1+
𝛽
𝛾𝜌
)
𝜃∗
𝜒
}+𝛽
𝜃∗
𝜒
(
𝜌
𝜆∗
− 1 −
𝛽
𝛾𝜌
)]
𝑗
𝜐𝑡−𝑗 +
1
𝜌
(𝜂∗𝑤𝑡 −
𝛼
𝛾
∑ 𝜆∗𝑗∞𝑗=1 [
1
𝜌−𝜆∗+𝛼{
1
𝛾
+(1+
𝛽
𝛾𝜌
)
𝜃∗
𝜒
}+𝛽
𝜃∗
𝜒
(
𝜌
𝜆∗
− 1 −
𝛽
𝛾𝜌
)]
𝑗
𝑤𝑡−𝑗))                                                  (45a)  
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We define ?̅?∗, 𝜆∗, and 𝜂∗ in (45b). 
?̅?∗ = [
𝛼0 {
1
𝛾 + (1 +
𝛽
𝛾𝜌)
𝜃∗
𝜒 } +
𝛽
𝛾𝜌
𝜃∗
𝜒 𝐼
̅
𝛼 {
1
𝛾 + (1 +
𝛽
𝛾𝜌)
𝜃∗
𝜒 } + 𝛽 (
𝜆∗
𝛾𝜌 +
𝜃∗
𝜒 )
] (1 −
𝛽𝜆∗
𝛾𝜌2
) ,
(𝜌 − 𝜆∗)(1 − 𝜆∗)
𝜆∗
= 𝛼 {
1
𝛾
+ (1 +
𝛽
𝛾𝜌
)
𝜃∗
𝜒
} + 𝛽 (
1
𝛾𝜌
+
𝜃∗
𝜒
) ,   0 < 𝜆∗ < 1 <
𝜌
𝜆∗
 ,
𝜂∗ =
𝜌 − 𝜆∗ + 𝛽
𝜃∗
𝜒
𝛾 {
1
𝛾 + (1 +
𝛽
𝛾𝜌)
𝜃∗
𝜒 }
 .
}
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(45b) 
 
The expected spot price and variance in period 𝑡 + 𝑇 conditional on information at time 𝑡 are: 
𝐸𝑡𝑠𝑡+𝑇
∗ = ?̅?∗ +
1
𝛼+𝛾𝜂∗
{𝜆∗𝑇 [
1
𝜌−𝜆∗+𝛼{
1
𝛾
+(1+
𝛽
𝛾𝜌
)
𝜃∗
𝜒
}+𝛽
𝜃∗
𝜒
(
𝜌
𝜆∗
− 1 −
𝛽
𝛾𝜌
)]
𝑇
} (∑ 𝜆∗𝑗∞𝑗=0 [
1
𝜌−𝜆∗+𝛼{
1
𝛾
+(1+
𝛽
𝛾𝜌
)
𝜃∗
𝜒
}+𝛽
𝜃∗
𝜒
(
𝜌
𝜆∗
− 1 −
𝛽
𝛾𝜌
)]
𝑗
⋅ 𝑢𝑡−𝑗 − (1 +
𝛼
𝛾𝜌
) ⋅
∑ 𝜆∗𝑗∞𝑗=0 [
1
𝜌−𝜆∗+𝛼{
1
𝛾
+(1+
𝛽
𝛾𝜌
)
𝜃∗
𝜒
}+𝛽
𝜃∗
𝜒
(
𝜌
𝜆∗
− 1 −
𝛽
𝛾𝜌
)]
𝑗
⋅ 𝜐𝑡−𝑗 −
𝛼
𝛾𝜌
⋅
∑ 𝜆∗𝑗∞𝑗=0 [
1
𝜌−𝜆∗+𝛼{
1
𝛾
+(1+
𝛽
𝛾𝜌
)
𝜃∗
𝜒
}+𝛽
𝜃∗
𝜒
(
𝜌
𝜆∗
− 1 −
𝛽
𝛾𝜌
)]
𝑗
𝑤𝑡−𝑗)                                                  (46)  
𝑉𝑡𝑠𝑡+𝑇
∗ = (
1
𝛼+𝛾𝜂∗
)
2
[
 
 
 
 1−𝜆∗2𝑇[ 1
𝜌−𝜆∗+𝛼{
1
𝛾
+(1+
𝛽
𝛾𝜌
)
𝜃∗
𝜒
}+𝛽
𝜃∗
𝜒
(
𝜌
𝜆∗
−1−
𝛽
𝛾𝜌
)]
2𝑇
1−𝜆∗2[
1
𝜌−𝜆∗+𝛼{
1
𝛾
+(1+
𝛽
𝛾𝜌
)
𝜃∗
𝜒
}+𝛽
𝜃∗
𝜒
(
𝜌
𝜆∗
−1−
𝛽
𝛾𝜌
)]
2 𝜎𝑢
2 +
{
 
 
 
 
(
𝜌−𝜂∗
𝜌
)
2
+ (1 +
𝛼
𝛾𝜌
)
2
⋅
𝜆∗2[
1
𝜌−𝜆∗+𝛼{
1
𝛾
+(1+
𝛽
𝛾𝜌
)
𝜃∗
𝜒
}+𝛽
𝜃∗
𝜒
(
𝜌
𝜆∗
−1−
𝛽
𝛾𝜌
)]
2
−𝜆∗2𝑇[
1
𝜌−𝜆∗+𝛼{
1
𝛾
+(1+
𝛽
𝛾𝜌
)
𝜃∗
𝜒
}+𝛽
𝜃∗
𝜒
(
𝜌
𝜆∗
−1−
𝛽
𝛾𝜌
)]
2𝑇
1−𝜆∗2[
1
𝜌−𝜆∗+𝛼{
1
𝛾
+(1+
𝛽
𝛾𝜌
)
𝜃∗
𝜒
}+𝛽
𝜃∗
𝜒
(
𝜌
𝜆∗
−1−
𝛽
𝛾𝜌
)]
2
}
 
 
 
 
⋅ 𝜎𝑣
2 +
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{
 
 
 
 
(
𝜂∗
𝜌
)
2
+ (
𝛼
𝛾𝜌
)
2
⋅
𝜆∗2[
1
𝜌−𝜆∗+𝛼{
1
𝛾
+(1+
𝛽
𝛾𝜌
)
𝜃∗
𝜒
}+𝛽
𝜃∗
𝜒
(
𝜌
𝜆∗
−1−
𝛽
𝛾𝜌
)]
2
−𝜆∗2𝑇[
1
𝜌−𝜆∗+𝛼{
1
𝛾
+(1+
𝛽
𝛾𝜌
)
𝜃∗
𝜒
}+𝛽
𝜃∗
𝜒
(
𝜌
𝜆∗
−1−
𝛽
𝛾𝜌
)]
2𝑇
1−𝜆∗2[
1
𝜌−𝜆∗+𝛼{
1
𝛾
+(1+
𝛽
𝛾𝜌
)
𝜃∗
𝜒
}+𝛽
𝜃∗
𝜒
(
𝜌
𝜆∗
−1−
𝛽
𝛾𝜌
)]
2
}
 
 
 
 
⋅ 𝜎𝑤
2
]
 
 
 
 
           (47)  
We can get 𝐸𝑡𝑠𝑡+1
∗  from (46),  and substitute it along with 𝑠𝑡
∗ into (39) to obtain the rational 
expectations futures price: 
𝑓𝑡 = 𝑓̅ +
1
𝛼+𝛾𝜂∗
{
 
 
 
 𝜒
𝜃∗
𝜆∗[
1
𝜌−𝜆∗+𝛼{
1
𝛾
+(1+
𝛽
𝛾𝜌
)
𝜃∗
𝜒
}+𝛽
𝜃∗
𝜒
(
𝜌
𝜆∗
−1−
𝛽
𝛾𝜌
)]+𝛾𝜌
𝛽
𝜌
+𝛾+
𝜒
𝜃∗
⋅ [∑ 𝜆∗𝑗∞𝑗=0 [
1
𝜌−𝜆∗+𝛼{
1
𝛾
+(1+
𝛽
𝛾𝜌
)
𝜃∗
𝜒
}+𝛽
𝜃∗
𝜒
(
𝜌
𝜆∗
−
1 −
𝛽
𝛾𝜌
)]
𝑗
⋅ 𝑢𝑡−𝑗 − (1 +
𝛼
𝛾𝜌
) ⋅ ∑ 𝜆∗𝑗∞𝑗=0 [
1
𝜌−𝜆∗+𝛼{
1
𝛾
+(1+
𝛽
𝛾𝜌
)
𝜃∗
𝜒
}+𝛽
𝜃∗
𝜒
(
𝜌
𝜆∗
− 1 −
𝛽
𝛾𝜌
)]
𝑗
⋅ 𝜐𝑡−𝑗 −
𝛼
𝛾𝜌
⋅ ∑ 𝜆∗𝑗∞𝑗=0 [
1
𝜌−𝜆∗+𝛼{
1
𝛾
+(1+
𝛽
𝛾𝜌
)
𝜃∗
𝜒
}+𝛽
𝜃∗
𝜒
(
𝜌
𝜆∗
− 1 −
𝛽
𝛾𝜌
)]
𝑗
𝑤𝑡−𝑗]
}
 
 
 
 
                                            (48a)  
The long term expected value of the futures price, 𝑓,̅ can be expressed as: 
𝑓̅ = lim
𝑇→∞
𝐸𝑡𝑓𝑡+𝑇 =
1
𝛽
𝜌
+𝛾+
𝜒
𝜃∗
(−𝐼̅ + (
𝜒
𝜃∗
+ 𝛾𝜌) [
𝛼0{
1
𝛾
+(1+
𝛽
𝛾𝜌
)
𝜃∗
𝜒
}+
𝛽
𝛾𝜌
𝜃∗
𝜒
𝐼̅
𝛼{
1
𝛾
+(1+
𝛽
𝛾𝜌
)
𝜃∗
𝜒
}+𝛽(
𝜆∗
𝛾𝜌
+
𝜃∗
𝜒
)
] (1 −
𝛽𝜆∗
𝛾𝜌2
))                      (48b)  
The conditional variance of futures price is found in the same fashion as for spot price, and is 
expressed as: 
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𝑉𝑡𝑓𝑡+𝑇 = (
1
𝛼+𝛾𝜂∗
)
2
{
 
 
 
 
1
(
𝛽
𝜌
+𝛾+
𝜒
𝜃∗
)
2 (
𝜒
𝜃∗
𝜆∗ [
1
𝜌−𝜆∗+𝛼{
1
𝛾
+(1+
𝛽
𝛾𝜌
)
𝜃∗
𝜒
}+𝛽
𝜃∗
𝜒
(
𝜌
𝜆∗
− 1 −
𝛽
𝛾𝜌
)] + 𝛾𝜌)
2
⋅ [𝜎𝑢
2 + (1 +
𝛼
𝛾𝜌
)
2
𝜎𝑣
2 + (
𝛼
𝛾𝜌
)
2
𝜎𝑤
2] ⋅
1−𝜆∗2𝑇[
1
𝜌−𝜆∗+𝛼{
1
𝛾
+(1+
𝛽
𝛾𝜌
)
𝜃∗
𝜒
}+𝛽
𝜃∗
𝜒
(
𝜌
𝜆∗
−1−
𝛽
𝛾𝜌
)]
2𝑇
1−𝜆∗2[
1
𝜌−𝜆∗+𝛼{
1
𝛾
+(1+
𝛽
𝛾𝜌
)
𝜃∗
𝜒
}+𝛽
𝜃∗
𝜒
(
𝜌
𝜆∗
−1−
𝛽
𝛾𝜌
)]
2
}
 
 
 
 
                                     (49)  
3.3. Spot Price Volatility with and Without Futures Trading 
3.3.1. General Comparison of Price Volatility 
Continuing from Kawai, we examine if the introduction of a futures market changes the 
volatility of spot prices.  To examine this volatility, we take into consideration the conditional 
variance of spot price (𝑉𝑡𝑠𝑡+𝑇 and 𝑉𝑡𝑠𝑡+𝑇
∗ ).  We deem the short-term variance as that which pertains 
to 𝑇 = 1 and the long-term variance when 𝑇 > 1.   
We can see that a general comparison between the conditional variance of spot price with a 
futures market and without a futures market is quite difficult.  As Kawai points out, “the difficulty 
arises from the fact that an indicator of price uncertainty 𝜃 (or 𝜃∗) is one of the structural 
coefficients, which in turn determines the equilibrium spot price and its conditional variances 
including 𝜃 = 𝑉𝑡𝑠𝑡+1 (or 𝜃
∗ = 𝑉𝑡𝑠𝑡+1
∗ ) itself, so that complicated nonlinear relationships exist 
among the structural parameters” (Kawai 1983, pg. 449).  This nonlinear relationship may lead to 
problems of nonexistence and nonuniqueness of a rational expectations solution (McCafferty and 
Driskill 1980; Kawai 1983). 
Thus, we can express again our conditional variances of spot price that we found earlier: 
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𝑉𝑡𝑠𝑡+𝑇 = (
1
𝛼+𝛾𝜂
)
2
⋅
[
 
 
 
 1−𝜆2𝑇[ 1
𝜌−𝜆+𝛼(
1
𝛾
+
𝜃
𝑣
)
(
𝜌
𝜆
−1−
1
𝛾
+
𝜃
𝑣
𝜌
𝛽
+
𝜃
𝜐
)]
2𝑇
1−𝜆2[
1
𝜌−𝜆+𝛼(
1
𝛾
+
𝜃
𝑣
)
(
𝜌
𝜆
−1−
1
𝛾
+
𝜃
𝑣
𝜌
𝛽
+
𝜃
𝜐
)]
2 𝜎𝑢
2 +
(
 
 
{
𝜌−𝛾𝜂(
1
𝛾
+
𝜃
𝑣
)
𝛽(
𝜌
𝛽
+
𝜃
𝜐
)
}
2
+
+{
𝛼(
1
𝛾
+
𝜃
𝑣
)+𝜌
𝛽(
𝜌
𝛽
+
𝜃
𝜐
)
}
2 𝜆2[
1
𝜌−𝜆+𝛼(
1
𝛾
+
𝜃
𝑣
)
(
𝜌
𝜆
−1−
1
𝛾
+
𝜃
𝑣
𝜌
𝛽
+
𝜃
𝜐
)]
2
−𝜆2𝑇[
1
𝜌−𝜆+𝛼(
1
𝛾
+
𝜃
𝑣
)
(
𝜌
𝜆
−1−
1
𝛾
+
𝜃
𝑣
𝜌
𝛽
+
𝜃
𝜐
)]
2𝑇
1−𝜆2[
1
𝜌−𝜆+𝛼(
1
𝛾
+
𝜃
𝑣
)
(
𝜌
𝜆
−1−
1
𝛾
+
𝜃
𝑣
𝜌
𝛽
+
𝜃
𝜐
)]
2
)
 
 
𝜎𝑣
2 +
{
 
 
 
 
(
𝜂
𝜌
)
2
+
+(
𝛼
𝛾𝜌
)
2
𝜆2[
1
𝜌−𝜆+𝛼(
1
𝛾
+
𝜃
𝑣
)
(
𝜌
𝜆
−1−
1
𝛾
+
𝜃
𝑣
𝜌
𝛽
+
𝜃
𝜐
)]
2
−𝜆2𝑇[
1
𝜌−𝜆+𝛼(
1
𝛾
+
𝜃
𝑣
)
(
𝜌
𝜆
−1−
1
𝛾
+
𝜃
𝑣
𝜌
𝛽
+
𝜃
𝜐
)]
2𝑇
1−𝜆2[
1
𝜌−𝜆+𝛼(
1
𝛾
+
𝜃
𝑣
)
(
𝜌
𝜆
−1−
1
𝛾
+
𝜃
𝑣
𝜌
𝛽
+
𝜃
𝜐
)]
2
}
 
 
 
 
𝜎𝑤
2
]
 
 
 
 
                                     (35)  
𝑉𝑡𝑠𝑡+𝑇
∗ = (
1
𝛼+𝛾𝜂∗
)
2
[
 
 
 
 1−𝜆∗2𝑇[ 1
𝜌−𝜆∗+𝛼{
1
𝛾
+(1+
𝛽
𝛾𝜌
)
𝜃∗
𝜒
}+𝛽
𝜃∗
𝜒
(
𝜌
𝜆∗
−1−
𝛽
𝛾𝜌
)]
2𝑇
1−𝜆∗2[
1
𝜌−𝜆∗+𝛼{
1
𝛾
+(1+
𝛽
𝛾𝜌
)
𝜃∗
𝜒
}+𝛽
𝜃∗
𝜒
(
𝜌
𝜆∗
−1−
𝛽
𝛾𝜌
)]
2 𝜎𝑢
2 +
{
 
 
 
 
(
𝜌−𝜂∗
𝜌
)
2
+ (1 +
𝛼
𝛾𝜌
)
2
⋅
𝜆∗2[
1
𝜌−𝜆∗+𝛼{
1
𝛾
+(1+
𝛽
𝛾𝜌
)
𝜃∗
𝜒
}+𝛽
𝜃∗
𝜒
(
𝜌
𝜆∗
−1−
𝛽
𝛾𝜌
)]
2
−𝜆∗2𝑇[
1
𝜌−𝜆∗+𝛼{
1
𝛾
+(1+
𝛽
𝛾𝜌
)
𝜃∗
𝜒
}+𝛽
𝜃∗
𝜒
(
𝜌
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𝛽
𝛾𝜌
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𝜌−𝜆∗+𝛼{
1
𝛾
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𝛽
𝛾𝜌
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𝜒
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𝜒
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𝜌
𝜆∗
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𝛽
𝛾𝜌
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2
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𝜌
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𝛼
𝛾𝜌
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𝛾
+(1+
𝛽
𝛾𝜌
)
𝜃∗
𝜒
}+𝛽
𝜃∗
𝜒
(
𝜌
𝜆∗
−1−
𝛽
𝛾𝜌
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2
−𝜆∗2𝑇[
1
𝜌−𝜆∗+𝛼{
1
𝛾
+(1+
𝛽
𝛾𝜌
)
𝜃∗
𝜒
}+𝛽
𝜃∗
𝜒
(
𝜌
𝜆∗
−1−
𝛽
𝛾𝜌
)]
2𝑇
1−𝜆∗2[
1
𝜌−𝜆∗+𝛼{
1
𝛾
+(1+
𝛽
𝛾𝜌
)
𝜃∗
𝜒
}+𝛽
𝜃∗
𝜒
(
𝜌
𝜆∗
−1−
𝛽
𝛾𝜌
)]
2
}
 
 
 
 
𝜎𝑤
2
]
 
 
 
 
                (47)  
 
where parameters {𝜃, 𝜆, 𝜂} and {𝜃∗, 𝜆∗, 𝜂∗} are related through the relationships: 
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𝜃 = (
1
𝛼 + 𝛾𝜂
)
2
⋅
[
 
 
 
𝜎𝑢
2 + {
𝜌 − 𝛾𝜂 (
1
𝛾 +
𝜃
𝑣)
𝛽 (
𝜌
𝛽 +
𝜃
𝜐)
}
2
⋅ 𝜎𝑣
2 + (
𝜂
𝜌
)
2
⋅ 𝜎𝑤
2
]
 
 
 
(50) 
(𝜌 − 𝜆)(1 − 𝜆)
𝜆
= (𝛼 +
1
𝜌
𝛽 +
𝜃
𝜐
)(
1
𝛾
+
𝜃
𝑣
) , 0 < 𝜆 < 1 (51) 
𝜂 =
𝜌 − 𝜆
𝛾 (
1
𝛾 +
𝜃
𝑣)
(52)
 
𝜃∗ = (
1
𝛼 + 𝛾𝜂∗
)
2
⋅ [𝜎𝑢
2 + (
𝜌 − 𝜂∗
𝜌
)
2
⋅ 𝜎𝑣
2 + (
𝜂∗
𝜌
)
2
⋅ 𝜎𝑤
2] (53) 
(𝜌 − 𝜆∗)(1 − 𝜆∗)
𝜆∗
= 𝛼 {
1
𝛾
+ (1 +
𝛽
𝛾𝜌
)
𝜃∗
𝜒
} + 𝛽 (
1
𝛾𝜌
+
𝜃∗
𝜒
) ,    0 < 𝜆∗ < 1 (54) 
𝜂∗ =
𝜌 − 𝜆∗ + 𝛽
𝜃∗
𝜒
𝛾 {
1
𝛾 + (1 +
𝛽
𝛾𝜌)
𝜃∗
𝜒 }
 (55) 
Due to the problematic nature of simultaneously solving for the triplets {𝜃, 𝜆, 𝜂} and {𝜃∗, 𝜆∗, 𝜂∗}, a 
general comparison of 𝑉𝑡𝑠𝑡+𝑇 and 𝑉𝑡𝑠𝑡+𝑇
∗  is “virtually impossible” (Kawai 1983).  Also, due to 
nonuniquenss and nonexistence mentioned earlier, it could also be the case that these triplets may 
not exist, or multiple solutions could be obtained. Kawai notes that the origins of the disturbances 
are what is important for making meaningful comparisons between the different spot price 
variances.  To do this, we resort to numerical illustrations.  
3.3.2. Numerical Illustrations 
We seek to quantitatively compare our derivation results to Kawai’s, as well as examine 
what happens to the spot price variance when different disturbances are dominant within the market.  
We utilize identical parameter values as Kawai.  Thus, we try different combinations of parameter 
values with 𝛾 = 1.2, 1.4, or 1.8, 𝛼 and 𝛽 taking values between 0.4 and 3.0, 𝜐 = 𝑣 = 1, 𝜌 = 1.1, 
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and 𝜎𝑢
2, 𝜎𝑣
2, 𝜎𝑤
2 = 1 or 100.  Different speculator risk attitudes are also accounted for, with 𝜔 = 0 
representing infinitely risk adverse speculators and 𝜔 = 100 representing approximately risk 
neutral pure speculators.  We utilize the python language to construct a program to solve for the 
triplets {𝜃, 𝜆, 𝜂} and {𝜃∗, 𝜆∗, 𝜂∗} as well as compute 𝑉𝑡𝑠𝑡+𝑇, 𝑉𝑡𝑠𝑡+𝑇
∗ , and 𝑉𝑡𝑓𝑡+𝑇.  For all cases, we 
are able to obtain the same results as Kawai indicating that for the chosen parameter values, our 
derivation is essentially equivalent to Kawai.  The results of our numerical illustration can be seen 
in table 1. 
We can see that when consumption, production, and inventory disturbances are all equal 
(𝜎𝑢
2, 𝜎𝑣
2, 𝜎𝑤
2 = 1), we cannot say whether spot price is stabilized in the presence of a futures market 
since we have some ambiguity depending on the parameter choice.  If the consumption disturbance 
is dominant (𝜎𝑢
2 = 100 and 𝜎𝑣
2, 𝜎𝑤
2 = 1) the presence of a futures market stabilizes the volatility of 
spot price in the short and long term no matter the risk attitudes of speculators (𝑉𝑡𝑠𝑡+𝑇
∗ < 𝑉𝑡𝑠𝑡+𝑇 for 
𝑇 = 1 or 𝑇 → ∞). When production is the dominant disturbance (𝜎𝑣
2 = 100 and 𝜎𝑢
2, 𝜎𝑤
2 = 1) we 
see that spot price is destabilized in the short run, but may or may not be stabilized in the long run 
(𝑉𝑡𝑠𝑡+𝑇
∗ > 𝑉𝑡𝑠𝑡+𝑇 for 𝑇 = 1 and 𝑉𝑡𝑠𝑡+𝑇
∗ ≷ 𝑉𝑡𝑠𝑡+𝑇 for 𝑇 → ∞).  Finally, we can see that when the 
inventory demand disturbance is the main stochastic factor (𝜎𝑤
2 = 100 and 𝜎𝑢
2, 𝜎𝑣
2 = 1) futures 
markets tend to destabilize spot price at both time horizons and speculative risk attitudes (𝑉𝑡𝑠𝑡+𝑇
∗ >
𝑉𝑡𝑠𝑡+𝑇 for 𝑇 = 1 and 𝑇 → ∞).  Thus, we cannot make any blanket statements in regards to the price 
stabilizing/destabilizing nature of futures markets. 
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Table 1. Numerical Illustrations 
α β γ
0.4 0.4 1.2 1.0 1.0 1.0 2.5844 3.1246 1.6091 2.0295 1.3308 1.1823 1.8621 0.6978
1.0 3.0 1.4 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.4051 0.4549 0.3487 0.3842 0.0674 0.3424 0.3959 0.0542
1.6 1.2 1.4 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.2211 0.2902 0.2214 0.2858 0.1079 0.2163 0.2960 0.0806
2.6 2.2 1.8 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.0961 0.1240 0.0974 0.1242 0.0385 0.0967 0.1280 0.0316
3.0 2.6 1.4 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.0914 0.1161 0.0938 0.1177 0.0343 0.0938 0.1219 0.0283
0.4 0.4 1.2 100.0 1.0 1.0 619.5172 619.5292 197.7421 197.7696 140.7523 114.8432 127.9596 55.3020
1.0 3.0 1.4 100.0 1.0 1.0 97.8255 97.8371 24.4645 24.4696 3.3650 21.6595 22.4770 1.7371
1.6 1.2 1.4 100.0 1.0 1.0 37.7224 37.7336 18.8623 18.8758 6.9752 14.2910 15.3200 1.9360
2.6 2.2 1.8 100.0 1.0 1.0 13.9879 13.9984 7.3383 7.3471 1.8671 6.0541 6.3980 0.5304
3.0 2.6 1.4 100.0 1.0 1.0 10.4333 10.4433 6.2563 6.2618 1.0079 5.5988 5.7928 0.2947
0.4 0.4 1.2 1.0 100.0 1.0 5.0200 26.0402 113.8442 113.9761 231.2386 22.5557 58.5602 55.0074
1.0 3.0 1.4 1.0 100.0 1.0 0.6695 2.1900 2.3617 2.9239 6.7348 1.3700 4.8054 3.6410
1.6 1.2 1.4 1.0 100.0 1.0 0.5564 3.9690 4.3729 4.9184 21.1459 1.2159 6.4457 5.5744
2.6 2.2 1.8 1.0 100.0 1.0 0.2308 1.6472 0.8664 1.5748 5.1263 0.4016 2.4687 2.1349
3.0 2.6 1.4 1.0 100.0 1.0 0.1731 1.4117 0.3969 1.3819 3.2994 0.2606 2.0697 1.8488
0.4 0.4 1.2 1.0 1.0 100.0 6.7564 8.3592 15.8858 16.1325 12.5615 23.4801 25.9686 3.8585
1.0 3.0 1.4 1.0 1.0 100.0 2.6141 3.4296 11.2006 11.2098 1.4244 12.4914 12.9327 0.7071
1.6 1.2 1.4 1.0 1.0 100.0 1.7842 2.5366 4.7698 4.9011 5.8648 7.0493 8.3114 1.7744
2.6 2.2 1.8 1.0 1.0 100.0 1.0055 1.4341 2.5629 2.6361 2.4972 3.4719 4.0937 0.8074
3.0 2.6 1.4 1.0 1.0 100.0 1.0719 1.5888 2.8818 2.9458 2.9808 3.7066 4.4210 0.9522
Numerical Illustrations: υ = ν = 1.0, ρ = 1.1
Commodity Market 
without Futures
Commodity Market with Futures    
(ω = 0)
Commodity Market with Futures     
(ω = 100)
lim
𝑇→∞
𝑉𝑡𝑠𝑡+𝑇
∗ lim
𝑇→∞
𝑉𝑡𝑓𝑡+𝑇
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4. DATA 
4.1. Oil 
There are five Petroleum Administration for Defense Districts (PADDs) in the US, each 
corresponding to a different geographic region. They are conveniently named PADD I (eastern US), 
II (Midwest and central plains region), III (southern US from AL to NM), IV (Rocky Mountain 
region), and V (western US).  The Energy Information Administration (EIA) keeps data on monthly 
ending stocks by PADD for Crude Oil in the United States.  We obtain a monthly time series of 
ending stocks by PADD for crude oil from January 1990-December 2017. The sum of all PADD’s 
ending stocks is the national ending stocks.  All the stock data was obtained from EIA. 
 The EIA keeps track of data for U.S. Crude Oil Domestic Acquisition Cost by Refiners.  
Refiner acquisition cost (RAC) of crude oil refers to the cost of crude oil, including transportation 
and other fees paid by the refiner. The refiner acquisition cost does not include the cost of crude oil 
purchased for the Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR), and the domestic portion refers to Crude oil 
produced in the U.S. or from its "outer continental shelf" (EIA; Petroleum & Other Liquid).  This 
cost was chosen because the EIA keeps track of it for every PADD as well as nationally which 
allows us to examine regional and national oil markets.  RAC will be used as a to represent the spot 
price of crude oil.  We have obtained a monthly series for the national price from January 1990 to 
December 2017 and by PADD from January 2004 to December 2017.  For West Texas Intermediate 
(WTI) futures prices, we obtained a monthly series of closing prices for the NYMEX (New York 
Mercantile Exchange) WTI front contract (the contract nearest expiration) from Bloomberg for 
January 1990-December 2017. 
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4.2. Corn 
There is not monthly corn stock data available for North Dakota.  We constructed the 
monthly ending stock data manually which runs from January 2002-December 2016.  In order to 
construct our monthly corn stocks data, we begin with the quarterly stocks of North Dakota corn 
measured in bushels.  These quarterly stocks are available from the United States Department of 
Agriculture (USDA) National Agricultural Statistics Service (NASS) quick stats for the first of 
March, the first of June, the first of September, and the first of December of each year.   
Next, we find the monthly production of corn; which is the number of bushels of corn 
harvested in a given month.  To accomplish this, we get the yearly total production of corn in 
bushels for North Dakota from NASS.  We obtain the weekly percentage harvested for North 
Dakota from the USDA crop progress reports (NASS Quick Stats).  Since these reports are weekly, 
we choose the report for the week which has an ending date that is the closest to the last day of the 
month, which sometimes results in the choice of a report for a week which ends in the next month.  
Since the report’s percentages are cumulative, we subtract the percent harvested in earlier months 
from a given report to obtain the percent harvested in that particular month.  However, since the 
last crop progress report that corn appears on usually does not show that 100% of corn has been 
harvested, we add the remaining percentage to the last month of harvest (usually November) to 
make the total percentage harvested equal to 100%.  Once we have a monthly percentage harvested, 
we take that percentage multiplied with the yearly bushels of corn produced to get a monthly 
number of bushels produced. 
To find out the amount of corn which is exported from North Dakota each month we use 
the North Dakota Grain and Oilseed Transportation Statistics report which is produced each year 
by the Upper Great Plains Transportation Institute (UGPTI) (Vachal and Benson 2017). In these 
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reports, we find the grain movements by month which show the total number of bushels for each 
particular grain that are transported each month and also the total number of bushels transported for 
a given year.  Next, we find the North Dakota corn shipments by destination which shows the total 
number of bushels shipped yearly to specific destinations.  Within these destinations is a section 
for the number of bushels shipped to a destination in North Dakota.  Since we want to know the 
number of bushels that are exported from ND, we take the number of bushels with a destination of 
ND and divide it by 12 to get an average number of bushels with a destination of ND per month.  
We subtract this average from the number of bushels moved in each month.  Now we have an 
estimate for the number of bushels exported from ND each month.   
Next, we must get the number of bushels of corn that are used for ethanol production in ND.  
There are currently five ethanol plants in ND with each coming online since 2007.  Previously there 
were two small ethanol production facilities in the state with one ceasing operation around July 
2012 and the other around October 2007.  To get an idea of the number of bushels these facilities 
use, we get each plant’s yearly production capacity.  The Nebraska Energy Office keeps track of 
each plant’s yearly ethanol production capacity in millions of gallons of ethanol for each month 
(Ethanol Production Capacity by Plant). However, the Nebraska Energy Office only has this data 
from January 2005 onwards, so we must assume that the production capacity was the same going 
back to December 2001 which is reasonable since the capacity is small to begin with and also since 
we are unable to obtain any information on capacity changes at the plants operating over that time 
period.  Therefore, we assume that each plant is operating at full capacity for each month it is in 
operation.  To convert this ethanol production capacity into an amount of bushels used we take the 
annualized capacity every month, multiply it by 1 million to show the total capacity (not represented 
in millions of gallons), divide this by 2.8 (to represent 1 bushel of corn producing 2.8 gallons of 
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ethanol; North Dakota Ethanol Industry),  and then divide that number by 12 in order to get a 
monthly value of the bushels of corn used for ethanol production.  It is important to note here that 
we are assuming that each plant is operating at full capacity for each month since we do not know 
at what percent capacity they are operating at in each month.  The North Dakota Ethanol Council 
(NDEC) says on their website that over 80% of the corn used for ethanol production in ND is 
purchased from ND farmers (North Dakota Ethanol Industry).  Therefore, we take our previous 
number of bushels used and multiply it by 85%; the extra 5% is included since the NDEC only says 
over 80%. 
Finally, to construct our monthly series of ending stocks, we start with the NASS beginning 
stocks for December 2001, we add our calculated value for production in that month, subtract the 
calculated exports for that month, and subtract the estimated bushels used for ethanol for that month.  
The result is our estimated ending stocks for December 2001.  Intuitively it makes sense that the 
ending stocks of one month are also the beginning stocks for the next month; hence, our estimated 
ending stocks for December 2001 are also our beginning stocks for January 2002.  We find January 
2002 ending stocks in the same fashion that we found the December 2001 ending stocks.  We 
incorporate the NASS quarterly stock data by utilizing their stock number for the beginning stocks 
for each month that they have data and using it as the ending stocks of the preceding month.    We 
calculate our stocks in this way and utilize the NASS data for the months that it is available and 
then rely on our calculated estimates for all other months.   
For spot price, we utilize the monthly price receive in dollars per bushel for North Dakota 
which was obtained from NASS.  For futures prices, we use a series of the monthly closing price 
for the front contract of the Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT) corn futures contract which was 
obtained from Bloomberg. 
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4.3. Soybeans 
Like corn, we were unable to obtain a previously compiled series of monthly stocks for 
soybeans.  We construct the monthly ending stocks in much the same way that we previously did 
for corn using the same type of NASS and UGPTI data.  The major differences are that there may 
be no significant users of soybeans within the state that we are aware of, so we have no inclusion 
of “use” data in our monthly soybean’s stocks. However, even in the absence of “use” data, we are 
still able to obtain an estimate of monthly inventories.  Our constructed series for soybeans also 
runs from January 2002-December 2016.   
Again, for spot price, we utilize the monthly price received in dollars per bushel for North 
Dakota obtained from NASS.  For futures prices, we use a series of the monthly closing price for 
the front contract of the Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT) soybeans futures contract which was 
obtained from Bloomberg.    
4.4. Hard Red Spring Wheat (HRS) 
Like the other agricultural commodities, there was no monthly stock data for HRS for North 
Dakota.  Therefore, to construct our stock data for HRS, we once again use the same NASS and 
UGPTI data for wheat.  Similar to soybeans, we cannot find sources or proxies for the number of 
bushels of hard red spring wheat used in ND, so we have not included “use” figures in our monthly 
ending stocks calculation.  Another issue we faced for HRS is that the NASS quarterly stocks has 
data for durum wheat and total wheat.  According to the NASS’s small grains annual summary 
(usda.library.cornell.edu), they estimate that the production distribution of other spring wheat 
(excluding durum) by class is 100% HRS for the state of ND for every year of our study.  Also, 
based on the small grain’s annual summary, the amount of winter wheat produced yearly is 
minuscule compared to HRS and Durum.  Therefore, since HRSW is the dominant spring wheat in 
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ND and winter wheat is minuscule we can obtain the quarterly stock estimate for HRS by taking 
the NASS total wheat stock minus the NASS Durum stock for each observation to obtain an HRS 
estimated quarterly stock.  The calculation of the monthly ending stocks continues in the same 
fashion as we did for the other two commodities.  We obtain monthly stocks of HRS for the period 
as the other two commodities, January 2002-December 2016.   
For spot price, we obtain the monthly price received (in dollars per bushel) for spring wheat 
(excluding Durum) for North Dakota from NASS.  For futures prices, we use a series of the monthly 
closing price for the front contract of the Minneapolis Grain Exchange (MGE) HRS futures contract 
which was obtained from Bloomberg. 
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5. METHODOLOGY 
5.1. Unit Root Tests 
Unit root testing provides a way to understand if a series of data has changing mean and/or 
variance over time.  If it is the case that mean or variance of a series are changing over time, we 
can say that the series has a unit root.  A nonstationary time series contains one or more unit roots 
while a stationary series does not have a unit root.  Nonstationary time series do not have a constant 
probability distribution in time, and hence, they exhibit a trend.  Stationary time series have a 
constant probability distribution in time which is favorable for analysis.  Therefore, when dealing 
with time series data, it is essential to know if the series is stationary.  To do so, we utilize unit root 
tests.   
The two tests we employ are the augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test and the Kwiatkowski, 
Phillips, Schmidt, Shin (KPSS) test (Dickey and Fuller 1979; Kwiatkowski et al. 1992).  The ADF 
tests a null hypothesis that the given series has a unit root while the KPSS test has a null hypothesis 
that the given series is stationary, essentially testing for no unit root.  For our purposes, the ADF 
test is employed in the next section when examining cointegration, while we use the KPSS test for 
our series of data.  The KPSS test is generally believed to be a higher-powered unit root test, and 
we use it here to identify which series are stationary and their order of integration. 
When dealing with time series data, the unit root tests are first performed on the level data.  
If the level data is determined to be nonstationary, the series can be differenced and retested which 
will usually solve the nonstationary issue and result in a stationary series.  A series that has not been 
differenced is said to be integrated of order zero, or 𝐼(0). When a series has been differenced once, 
it is said to be integrated of order one, or 𝐼(1).  The order of integration is important because 
variables should be integrated of the same order when estimating a model.  Table 2 has results of 
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the KPSS test for our oil data while Table 3 carries results for the agricultural data.  We ran the 
KPSS test for each variable with a constant as the only exogenous variable.  If the level data 
appeared to be nonstationary, we also performed the test on the first differences. 
 We see that for the national oil data we can soundly reject the null hypothesis of stationarity 
on the levels for all three variables.  When differenced once, we fail to reject the null hypothesis 
for the national oil variables which lends support that the first difference of the variables is now 
stationary.  When investigating the PADD oil data, we do not see the same type of results.  It appears 
that for the PADD data, the futures price is now stationary in the level (we are testing over a 
different period), as well as the RAC for each PADD.  However, it appears that the ending stocks 
for each PADD are not stationary in the level but are stationary in the first difference. 
The results of the KPSS tests for the agricultural data suggests that most of the data contain 
a unit root.  For corn, we can reject the null hypothesis for all three variables at the 1% significance 
level for the level variables, while the first differences appear stationary.  Soybean results also 
suggest nonstationary in the levels, with futures price and price received able to reject the null at 
the 1% level, while ending stocks can do so at the 5% level. Once again, all three soybean variables 
are stationary in the first difference.  HRS Wheat futures price and price received are also 
nonstationary in the levels with 5% significance while ending stocks appears to be stationary.  Both 
futures price and price received are stationary in the first difference. 
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Table 2. Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin test - Oil 
Null Hypothesis: The series is stationary     
Variables 
Time 
Period 
Exogenous 
Variables 
LM-stat 
(level) 
LM-stat 
(first diff.) 
Oil Futures 
Price 
1990-2017 Constant 1.543756*** 0.051773 
National 
RAC 
1990-2017 Constant 1.540272*** 0.069808 
National Oil 
Ending 
Stocks 
1990-2017 Constant 0.761872*** 0.131924 
Oil Futures 
Price 
2004-2017 Constant 0.284237   
PADD 2 
RAC 
2004-2017 Constant 0.283311   
PADD 2 
Ending 
Stocks 
2004-2017 Constant 1.427856*** 0.04278 
PADD 3 
RAC 
2004-2017 Constant 0.302991   
PADD 3 
Ending 
Stocks 
2004-2017 Constant 0.99518*** 0.072617 
PADD 4 
RAC 
2004-2017 Constant 0.270123   
PADD 4 
Ending 
Stocks 
2004-2017 Constant 1.345832*** 0.197414 
PADD 5 
RAC 
2004-2017 Constant 0.321593   
PADD 5 
Ending 
Stocks 
2004-2017 Constant 0.060231   
*     10% Significance       
**    5 % Significance       
***  1% Significance       
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Table 3. Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin test - Agriculture 
Null Hypothesis: The series is stationary     
Variables 
Time 
Period 
Exogenous 
Variables 
LM-stat 
(level) 
LM-stat 
(first diff.) 
Corn 
Futures 
Price 
2002-2016 Constant 0.796674*** 0.106941 
Corn Price 
Received 
2002-2016 Constant 0.821863*** 0.16515 
Corn 
Ending 
Stocks 
2002-2016 Constant 1.494899*** 0.110254 
Soybeans 
Futures 
Price 
2002-2016 Constant 1.055223*** 0.095598 
Soybeans 
Price 
Received 
2002-2016 Constant 1.084456*** 0.152715 
Soybeans 
Ending 
Stocks 
2002-2016 Constant 0.481147** 0.188342 
HRS Wheat 
Futures 
Price 
2002-2016 Constant 0.574659** 0.078475 
HRS Wheat 
Price 
Received 
2002-2016 Constant 0.605427** 0.112178 
HRS Wheat 
Ending 
Stocks 
2002-2016 Constant 0.307603   
*     10% Significance       
**    5 % Significance       
***  1% Significance       
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5.2. Engle-Granger Cointegration Test 
For variables that are integrated of the same order, if a linear combination of these variables 
is stationary, the variables are said to be cointegrated.  More formally, the components of some 
vector 𝑣𝑡 = (𝑣1𝑡, 𝑣2𝑡 , … , 𝑣𝑛𝑡)′ are cointegrated of order 𝑑, 𝑏, denoted 𝑣𝑡~𝐶𝐼(𝑑, 𝑏) if: (1) all 
elements of vector 𝑣𝑡 are integrated of order 𝑑, 𝐼(𝑑), and (2) there exists some cointegrating vector 
𝛿 = (𝛿1, 𝛿2, … , 𝛿𝑛) such that a linear combination 𝛿𝑣𝑡 = 𝛿1𝑣1𝑡 + 𝛿2𝑣2𝑡 +⋯+ 𝛿𝑛𝑣𝑛𝑡 is integrated 
of order (𝑑 − 𝑏) where 𝑏 > 0 (Engle and Granger 1987; Enders 2010).  Hence, variables with a 
different order of integration cannot be cointegrated.   
We test for cointegration using the Engle-Granger (1987) method.  The test is a unit root 
test on residuals obtained from a regression. The Engle-Granger method employs the ADF unit root 
test mentioned in the previous section.  The first step in the procedure is to employ unit root tests 
to ensure all variables are integrated of the same order, which was done in the previous section (see 
Table 2 and Table 3).  Next, we estimate the long-run equilibrium relationship for the different time 
series.  For two arbitrary series integrated of order one, 𝑥𝑡 and 𝑦𝑡, this can be done by estimating 
the regression 𝑦𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑥𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡.  The series of regression residuals is then tested for a unit root.  
The ADF test is used in determining cointegration, where we obtain two test statistics, the tau-
statistic (t-statistic) and the normalized autocorrelation coefficient which we refer to as the z-
statistic.  Critical values for the statistics can be found in MacKinnon (1996).  If the residuals do 
not contain a unit root (are stationary), we can say that 𝑦𝑡 and 𝑥𝑡 are cointegrated of order (1,1) 
(Enders 2010).  Overall, the Engle-Granger test has a null hypothesis that the series are not 
cointegrated since the null hypothesis of the unit root test is that the series contains a unit root.  The 
results of our cointegration tests are contained in Table 4.   
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We can see that for oil futures price and national RAC, both the tau-statistic and the z-
statistic suggest we can soundly reject the null hypothesis, letting us conclude that they are 
cointegrated.  For national oil ending stocks and oil futures, when ending stocks is the dependent 
variable, we can reject the null hypothesis; however, on balance, the results suggest they are not 
cointegrated.  Similarly, for national oil ending stocks and national RAC, only when ending stocks 
is the dependent variable, we can reject the null. Therefore, the series do not have a cointegrating 
relationship.  For corn futures price and corn price received, we can soundly conclude they are 
cointegrated.  The null hypothesis is also rejected for soybeans futures, and soybeans price received, 
indicating a cointegrating relationship.  Lastly, there is strong evidence that HRS wheat futures and 
price received are also cointegrated.  
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Table 4. Engle-Granger Cointegration Test 
Null Hypothesis: Series are not cointegrated 
Dependent 
Variable 
tau-statistic Prob.^ z-statistic Prob.^ 
Oil Futures 
Price 
-6.734058 0.0000*** -92.43425 0.0000*** 
National RAC -6.655748 0.0000*** -90.40870 0.0000*** 
Oil Futures 
Price 
-2.043983 0.5058 -8.117879 0.4841 
National Oil 
Ending Stocks 
-2.439838 0.3083 -24.74891 0.0188** 
National RAC -2.366635 0.3423 -11.05719 0.2998 
National Oil 
Ending Stocks 
-2.462531 0.2981 -25.28565 0.0167** 
Corn Futures 
Price 
-4.489999 0.0018*** -40.76904 0.0003*** 
Corn Price 
Received 
-4.322672 0.0031*** -37.78037 0.0007*** 
Corn Futures 
Price 
-2.031089 0.5133 -8.003023 0.4885 
Corn Ending 
Stocks 
-0.301972 0.9755 -1.020473 0.9669 
Corn Price 
Received 
-1.699799 0.6787 -5.434000 0.6939 
Corn Ending 
Stocks 
-0.364870 0.9719 -1.222639 0.9609 
Soybeans 
Futures Price 
-5.658662 0.0000*** -64.87981 0.0000*** 
Soybeans Price 
Received 
-5.401981 0.0001*** -58.96047 0.0000*** 
Soybeans 
Futures Price 
-2.246499 0.4026 -8.190861 0.4747 
Soybeans 
Ending Stocks 
-0.612376 0.9531 -2.258879 0.9191 
Soybeans Price 
Received 
-2.002835 0.5280 -5.934239 0.6525 
Soybeans 
Ending Stocks 
-0.616608 0.9527 -2.216826 0.9212 
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Table 4. Engle-Granger Cointegration Test (continued) 
 
Dependent 
Variable 
tau-statistic Prob.^ z-statistic Prob.^ 
HRS Wheat 
Futures Price 
-7.124047 0.0000*** -79.48459 0.0000*** 
HRS Wheat 
Price Received 
-6.709667 0.0000*** -72.32971 0.0000*** 
HRS Wheat 
Futures Price 
-2.787629 0.1748 -14.09031 0.1671 
HRS Wheat 
Ending Stocks 
-1.361484 0.8124 -5.649003 0.6758 
HRS Wheat 
Price Received 
-2.392476 0.3317 -10.37244 0.3320 
HRS Wheat 
Ending Stocks 
-1.329392 0.8225 -4.986089 0.7304 
^MacKinnon (1996) p-values. 
*     10% Significance       
**    5% Significance       
***  1% Significance       
 
5.3. Granger Causality 
Granger (1969) causality tests are commonly utilized to discover causal relationships among 
different time series.  These tests can also be useful in informing about the endogeneity of certain 
variables in a system.  To do this, the test examines if the lags of one variable are useful in 
explaining another variable.  Thus, in performing a Granger causality test, two regressions are 
estimated.  For two series 𝑌 and 𝑋, we regress 𝑌 against lagged values of 𝑌 and lagged values of 𝑋 
which gives us our unrestricted regression.  For the restricted regression, we regress 𝑌 against only 
lagged values of itself.  We then perform an F-test to see if the group of coefficients related to the 
lagged values of 𝑋 are significantly different from zero. If they are significant, we can reject the 
hypothesis that 𝑋 does not Granger cause 𝑌, since past values of 𝑋 help explain the current level of 
𝑌.  When the lags of one variable are useful in explaining another variable, we can then say that 𝑋 
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Granger causes 𝑌. If the results indicate that 𝑋 Granger causes 𝑌, and 𝑌 Granger causes 𝑋,  then 
we can say that it is likely one or more variables cause 𝑋 and 𝑌, indicating they are endogenous 
variables in the system.  Table 5 contains our results of the Granger causality test for the oil related 
variables while Table 6 contains the results for the agricultural variables.   
 We can reject the null hypothesis for national oil RAC Granger causing oil futures price, 
and in turn, we can also reject the null hypothesis that oil futures price Granger causes national oil 
RAC.  Hence, Granger causality suggests that national oil RAC and oil futures price are endogenous 
variables. There is also some weaker evidence (10% significance) that national ending stocks and 
futures price may be endogenous.  At 1% significance, we can see two-way Granger causality 
between PADD 2 RAC and futures price.   For PADD 3 RAC and futures price, we have two-way 
Granger causality with 10% significance.  Similarly, we can see that PADD 4 RAC and futures 
price are also endogenous variables.  Lastly, we can see that futures price and PADD 5 RAC 
Granger cause each other.  
 For our agricultural variables, we can see that they follow a similar pattern with regards to 
Granger causality as did the oil variables. For corn, we can see that futures price Granger causes 
price received but somewhat unexpectedly we fail to reject the null hypothesis for price received 
Granger causing futures price.  However, we do find two-way causality between soybeans futures 
price and soybeans price received.  Lastly, we also see strong evidence that HRS wheat futures and 
price received are endogenous variables.  
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Table 5. Granger Causality test – Oil 
Null Hypothesis: Lags: 3 F-Statistic Prob. 
National RAC does not Granger Cause 
Futures Price 
278.342 0.0000*** 
Futures Price does not Granger Cause 
National RAC 
10.3409 0.0000*** 
National Ending Stocks does not Granger 
Cause Futures Price 
2.43778 0.0645* 
Futures Price does not Granger Cause 
National Ending Stocks 
4.91727 0.0024*** 
Ending Stocks does not Granger Cause 
National RAC 
0.70106 0.5520 
National RAC does not Granger Cause 
National Ending Stocks 
3.90972 0.0091*** 
PADD2 RAC does not Granger Cause 
Futures Price 
149.507 0.0000*** 
Futures Price does not Granger Cause 
PADD2 RAC 
4.73155 0.0034*** 
PADD2 Ending Stocks does not Granger 
Cause Futures Price 
0.88012 0.4528 
Futures Price does not Granger Cause 
PADD2 Ending Stocks 
2.9547 0.0343** 
PADD2 Ending Stocks does not Granger 
Cause PADD2 RAC 
0.1224 0.9468 
PADD2 RAC does not Granger Cause 
PADD2 Ending Stocks 
5.4585 0.0014*** 
PADD3 RAC does not Granger Cause 
Futures Price 
97.9619 0.0000*** 
Futures Price does not Granger Cause 
PADD3 RAC 
2.43538 0.0668* 
PADD3 Ending Stocks does not Granger 
Cause Futures Price 
1.91392 0.1295 
Futures Price does not Granger Cause 
PADD3 Ending Stocks 
2.26213 0.0834* 
PADD3 Ending Stocks does not Granger 
Cause PADD3 RAC 
1.79852 0.1497 
PADD3 RAC does not Granger Cause 
PADD3 Ending Stocks 
1.07634 0.3609 
PADD4 RAC does not Granger Cause 
Futures Price 
105.253 0.0000*** 
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Table 5. Granger Causality test – Oil (continued) 
 
Null Hypothesis: Lags: 3 F-Statistic Prob. 
Futures Price does not Granger Cause 
PADD4 RAC 
3.56641 0.0156** 
PADD4 Ending Stocks does not Granger 
Cause Futures Price 
3.18091 0.0256** 
Futures Price does not Granger Cause 
PADD4 Ending Stocks 
1.29596 0.2778 
PADD4 Ending Stocks does not Granger 
Cause PADD4 RAC 
3.23118 0.024*** 
PADD4 RAC does not Granger Cause 
PADD4 Ending Stocks 
1.12416 0.3411 
PADD5 RAC does not Granger Cause 
Futures Price 
65.6667 0.0000*** 
Futures Price does not Granger Cause 
PADD5 RAC 
4.73045 0.0035*** 
PADD5 Ending Stocks does not Granger 
Cause Futures Price 
0.03242 0.9921 
Futures Price does not Granger Cause 
PADD5 Ending Stocks 
0.25966 0.8544 
PADD5 Ending Stocks does not Granger 
Cause PADD5 RAC 
0.04459 0.9874 
PADD5 RAC does not Granger Cause 
PADD5 Ending Stocks 
0.12175 0.9472 
*      10% Significance       
**    5% Significance       
***  1% Significance       
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Table 6. Granger Causality test – Agriculture 
Null Hypothesis: Lags: 3 F-Statistic Prob. 
Corn Price Received does not Granger Cause 
Corn Futures Price 
0.43585 0.7276 
Corn Futures Price does not Granger Cause 
Corn Price Received 
47.5034 0.0000*** 
Corn Ending Stocks does not Granger Cause 
Corn Futures Price 
0.4745 0.7004 
Corn Futures Price does not Granger Cause 
Corn Ending Stocks 
0.90792 0.4385 
Corn Ending Stocks does not Granger Cause 
Corn Price Received 
1.67607 0.1740 
Corn Price Received does not Granger Cause 
Corn Ending Stocks 
1.39044 0.2475 
Soybeans Price Received does not Granger 
Cause Soybeans Futures Price 
4.05667 0.0081*** 
Soybeans Futures Price does not Granger 
Cause Soybeans Price Received 
27.3454 0.0000*** 
Soybeans Ending Stocks does not Granger 
Cause Soybeans Futures Prices 
1.66839 0.1757 
Soybeans Futures Price does not Granger 
Cause Soybeans Ending Stocks 
2.33926 0.0753* 
Soybeans Ending Stocks does not Granger 
Cause Soybeans Price Received 
2.67468 0.0489** 
Soybeans Price Received does not Granger 
Cause Soybeans Ending Stocks 
2.02005 0.1130 
HRS Wheat Price Received does not Granger 
Cause HRS Wheat Futures Price 
8.92827 0.0000*** 
HRS Wheat Futures Price does not Granger 
Cause HRS Wheat Price Received 
66.6385 0.0000*** 
HRS Wheat Ending Stocks does not Granger 
Cause HRS Wheat Futures Price 
0.01928 0.9963 
HRS Wheat Futures Price does not Granger 
Cause HRS Wheat Ending Stocks 
0.89517 0.4449 
HRS Wheat Ending Stocks does not Granger 
Cause HRS Wheat Price Received 
0.58933 0.6228 
HRS Wheat Price Received does not Granger 
Cause HRS Wheat Ending Stocks 
1.79332 0.1503 
*      10% Significance       
**    5% Significance       
***  1% Significance       
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5.4. Directed Acyclic Graphs 
A directed acyclic graph (DAG) is an alternative technique to determine causal relations 
among variables.  DAGs present an alternative to the Granger causality tests insofar as DAGs 
explore non-time sequence asymmetry in causal relations as opposed to the Granger test which 
exploits the time sequence asymmetry (Yang et al. 2006).  These causal relations are determined 
by computer algorithms which produce graphs with nodes (vertices, variables) and edges between 
nodes.  Visually, a DAG is a graph, which is an ordered triple 〈𝑉,𝑀, 𝐸〉.  Here, 𝑉 is the vertex set, 
which is a non-empty set that contains nodes, 𝑀 is a non-empty set of marks which shows the 
directedness of an edge, and 𝐸 is the edge set, containing ordered pairs representing edges between 
nodes (Bessler and Yang 2003).  These edges indicate a causal relationship between nodes and can 
be either directed or undirected edges (indicated by the marks).  For two arbitrary nodes A and B, 
with a directed edge (indicated by a line with an arrow) from node A to node B, we can say that 
node A is a cause of node B.  For an undirected edge (indicated by a line between nodes) between 
node A and node B, we can say one of the following: a.) node A is a cause of node B, b.)  node B 
is a cause of node A, c.) there is some unmeasured confounder of A and B, d.) both a. and b., or e.) 
both b. and c. In determining endogeneity from these graphs, we can say that variables which have 
no causal input are exogenous while variables that are not exogenous are endogenous (Spirtes et 
al., 2000). 
Mathematically, following Miljkovic et al. (2016), a DAG is represented as the conditional 
independence by the recursive product decomposition: 
𝑃𝑟(𝑣1, 𝑣2, … , 𝑣𝑛) = ∏ 𝑃𝑟(𝑣𝑖|𝑝𝜋𝑖)
𝑛
𝑖=1 (56)
in which 𝑃𝑟 represents the probability of variables (𝑣1, 𝑣2, … , 𝑣𝑛).  The product operator is 
represented by Π, and 𝑝𝜋𝑖 represents the realization of some subset of variables that causes 𝑉𝑖 in 
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order (𝑖 = 1, 2, … , 𝑛).  Pearls’ (1995) work on d-separation allows independencies and causes to 
be translated graphically.  In explaining d-separation, consider the three variable set X, Y, and Z.  
If the flow of information between these nodes is blocked, we can say these variables are d-
separated.  This so-called d-separation can occur in two ways: (1) if one variable is the cause of the 
other two variables, i.e. Y in 𝑋 ← 𝑌 ⟶ 𝑍, or if there is a passthrough variable, i.e. Y in 𝑋 → 𝑌 →
𝑍; (2) when a variable is caused (effected) by two variables, i.e. Y in 𝑋 → 𝑌 ← 𝑍.  This notion of 
d-separation was incorporated into the PC algorithm by Spirtes et al. (1993). 
For our DAG’s, we utilized the PC algorithm and FGES algorithm with the TETRAD 
software version 6.5.4.  We chose these two algorithms because they complement each other nicely 
while providing alternatives for discovering relationships within the data.  The PC algorithm begins 
with a connected graph containing undirected edges between all nodes. The algorithm proceeds by 
performing independence and conditional independence tests on edges between nodes in order to 
remove edges.  For zero order conditioning, the algorithm tests if the conditional correlation 
between nodes is significantly different from zero using Fisher’s z (Awokuse and Bessler 2003). If 
the algorithm fails to reject the null hypothesis that the correlation between nodes is not significantly 
different from zero, then the edge between the nodes is removed (Li et al. 2013). The surviving 
edges are tested with first-order partial correlation; the edges between two nodes where first-order 
partial correlation is not statistically different from zero are removed (Ji et al., 2018). For N 
variables, this process continues for higher order partial correlation until an N − 2 order partial 
correlation test is finished or if no edges are remaining (Ji et al., 2018). Any remaining edges are 
directed via the theory of sepset.  For a more in-depth explanation of sepset’s see Yang and Bessler 
(2008). 
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The FGES algorithm is an optimized version of the GES algorithm that searches over 
equivalence classes of DAG’s and returns a model with the best Bayesian score (Chickering 2003; 
Ramsey et al. 2017). The algorithm begins its search with an unconnected graph. It then performs 
a forward search, adding the edge with the largest improvement in the Bayesian Information 
Criterion (BIC) in each step.  Once the algorithm reaches a point where no edges will improve the 
BIC, the algorithm moves to the backward stepping search.  For the backward stepping search, it 
begins with the previously discovered graph and then iteratively removes an edge in each step that 
gives the largest improvement in the Bayesian score until no more deletions will improve the score 
(Ramsey et al. 2017).  When the BIC cannot be improved by removing more edges, the algorithm 
returns the resulting graph.  
Our graphs produced by each algorithm can be seen in table 7.  For the PC algorithm, we 
have a significance level of 10%.  For total oil, we see both FGES and PC algorithms produce 
similar graphs containing an undirected edge between the futures price and RAC, suggesting that 
they are endogenous variables while ending stocks appears to be an exogenous variable.  The PADD 
2 FGES algorithm also produces a graph with an undirected edge between futures price and RAC, 
while the PC produces a cyclic undirected graph with all variables connected.  While the DAG 
results for PADD 2 appear to be ambiguous, if we also take the findings from PADD 2’s Granger 
causality test into account, we see that both the Granger test as well as the FGES algorithm lend 
credence to futures price and RAC being endogenous variables.  PADD 3 has both algorithms 
producing a connected graph, with undirected edges between both futures price and price received, 
as well as futures price and ending stocks, suggesting three endogenous variables.  The graphs for 
PADD 4 and PADD 5 are similar to each other for both algorithms, with an undirected edge between 
futures price and RAC, suggesting endogeneity of futures and RAC.    
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The agricultural graphs are similar to the oil graphs with many suggesting endogeneities 
between futures price and price received.  The corn graph suggests endogeneity for futures price 
and price received with the FGES algorithm, while the PC algorithm produces a graph with 
undirected edges between futures price and price received, as well as between ending stocks and 
futures price.  The algorithms for soybeans both suggest futures price and price received are 
endogenous.  The algorithms achieve a similar result for HRS wheat as they did for corn, with 
FGES suggesting futures price and price received are endogenous, and the PC showing undirected 
edges between price received and futures as well as ending stocks and futures. 
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Table 7. Directed Acyclic Graph Results 
  
Total Oil FGES algorithm Total Oil PC algorithm 
 
  
PADD 2 FGES algorithm PADD 2 PC algorithm 
  
PADD 3 FGES algorithm PADD 3 PC algorithm 
  
PADD 4 FGES algorithm PADD 4 PC algorithm 
  
PADD 5 FGES algorithm PADD 5 PC algorithm 
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Table 7. Directed Acyclic Graph Results (continued) 
 
  
Corn FGES algorithm Corn PC algorithm 
  
Soybeans FGES algorithm Soybeans PC algorithm 
  
HRS Wheat FGES algorithm HRS Wheat PC algorithm 
 
 
5.5. Vector Autoregression 
One of the goals of this thesis is to examine the dynamic relationships and interrelationships 
between ending stocks, and spot and futures price.  Given that aim and the fact that much of the 
previous results suggest that spot price and futures price are endogenous, we can utilize a vector 
autoregression (VAR) or vector error correction model (VECM). Sims (1980) introduced VAR as 
a new approach to estimating multiple equation models.  
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Interrelated time series are commonly estimated using VAR (Wilson and Miljkovic 2013).  
A VAR is a system of equations where all endogenous variables are a function of lagged values of 
itself, lagged values of the other endogenous variables, and any other exogenous explanatory 
variables that are deemed appropriate for the model.  Thus, mathematically we can represent a VAR 
as: 
𝑌𝑡 = 𝐵0 + 𝐵1𝑌𝑡−1 +⋯+ 𝐵𝑝𝑌𝑡−𝑝 + 𝐴0𝑋𝑡 + 𝐴1𝑋𝑡−1 +⋯+ 𝐴𝑝𝑋𝑡−𝑝 + 𝜀𝑡 (57) 
where  𝑌𝑡 is an 𝑛 × 1 vector of endogenous variables, 𝐵0, is an 𝑛 × 1 vector of intercept terms, 
𝐵1,…, 𝐵𝑝 are 𝑛 × 𝑛 matrices of coefficients to be estimated for lagged endogenous variables, 
𝐴0,…,𝐴𝑝 are 𝑛 × 𝑛 matrices related to coefficients of current and lagged exogenous variables, and 
𝜀𝑡 is an 𝑛 × 1 vector of innovations.  The innovations are not correlated with their own lagged 
values and are uncorrelated with all explanatory variables but may be contemporaneously correlated 
(Wilson and Miljkovic 2013).  Since all right-hand side explanatory variables are the same, ordinary 
least squares (OLS) yields efficient estimates (Enders 2010).   
5.6. Vector Error Correction 
When cointegration is present, we must change our estimation approach.  Since VAR 
models cannot deal with cointegration, we can restrict the VAR to achieve an error correcting 
approach.  VECM allow us to examine the short-term adjustments of cointegrated variables to their 
long-run equilibrium.  Similar to a VAR, in a VECM the differenced endogenous variables are a 
function of lagged differenced values of itself, lagged differenced values of other endogenous 
variables, differenced exogenous variables, and one or more cointegrating vectors which are the 
difference between the two cointegrated variables. Thus, we can represent a VECM mathematically 
as: 
Δ𝑌𝑡 = 𝐵0 + 𝜋𝑧𝑡−1 + 𝐵1Δ𝑌𝑡−1 +⋯+ 𝐵𝑝Δ𝑌𝑡−𝑝 + 𝐴0Δ𝑋𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡 (58) 
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where Δ is the difference operator, 𝐵0, is an 𝑛 × 1 vector of intercept terms, 𝐵1,…, 𝐵𝑝 are 𝑛 × 𝑛 
matrices of coefficients to be estimated for lagged endogenous variables, 𝑌𝑡 is an 𝑛 × 1 vector of 
endogenous variables, 𝑧𝑡−1 is a 1 × 𝑛 vector containing the difference of cointegrating variables 
forming our cointegrating vector, 𝜋 is an 𝑛 × 1 vector of adjustment coefficients related to our 
cointegrating vector, 𝐴0 is 𝑛 × 𝑛 matrices related to coefficients of our exogenous variables (we 
may include lagged exogenous variables in a VECM as well), and 𝜀𝑡 is an 𝑛 × 1 vector of 
innovations.  Note that if all elements of 𝜋 are zero, we simply have a VAR in first differences 
(Enders 2010).  
5.7. Impulse Response 
Impulse response functions allow us to observe over time how endogenous variables 
respond to an exogenous shock to itself as well as a shock to other endogenous variables.  Based 
on the dynamic structure of a VAR or VECM, a shock to one endogenous variable will affect that 
variable but can also affect other endogenous variables.  Thus, with impulse response functions, we 
can observe how a shock to one variable filters through the model to affect the other variables within 
the model (Pindyck and Rubinfeld 1998).  This technique ultimately allows us to examine what 
effect a shock in the futures market has on the time path of the spot market and vice versa.  
Following Enders (2010), we can express a VAR as a vector moving average (VMA) in 
matrix form for two arbitrary variables 𝑦𝑡 and 𝑧𝑡: 
[
𝑦𝑡
𝑧𝑡
] = [
?̅?
𝑧̅
] +∑[
𝑎11 𝑎12
𝑎21 𝑎22
] [
𝑒1𝑡−𝑖
𝑒2𝑡−𝑖
]
∞
𝑖=0
(59) 
We can rewrite the vector of errors as: 
[
𝑒1𝑡
𝑒2𝑡
] =
1
1 − 𝑏12𝑏21
[
1 −𝑏12
−𝑏21 1
] [
𝜀𝑦𝑡
𝜀𝑧𝑡
] (60) 
Combining (59) and (60) to express 𝑦𝑡 and 𝑧𝑡 in terms of 𝜀𝑦𝑡 and 𝜀𝑧𝑡 gives us: 
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[
𝑦𝑡
𝑧𝑡
] = [
?̅?
𝑧̅
] +
1
1 − 𝑏12𝑏21
∑[
𝑎11 𝑎12
𝑎21 𝑎22
]
𝑖
[
1 −𝑏12
−𝑏21 1
] [
𝜀𝑦𝑡−𝑖
𝜀𝑧𝑡−𝑖
]
∞
𝑖=0
(61) 
To simplify the notation, we can define the matrix 𝜙𝑖, whose elements are 𝜙𝑚𝑛(𝑖), as follows: 
𝜙𝑖 =
𝐴1
𝑖
1 − 𝑏12𝑏21
[
1 −𝑏12
−𝑏21 1
] (62) 
Thus, the vector moving average of a VAR in matrix form can be expressed as: 
[
𝑦𝑡
𝑧𝑡
] = [
?̅?
𝑧̅
] +∑[
𝜙11(𝑖) 𝜙12(𝑖)
𝜙21(𝑖) 𝜙22(𝑖)
] [
𝜀𝑦𝑡−𝑖
𝜀𝑧𝑡−𝑖
]
∞
𝑖=0
(63) 
Here the coefficients 𝜙11(𝑖), …, 𝜙22(𝑖) are the impulse response functions.  We can see that 𝜙11(0) 
is the instantaneous impact of a one unit change in 𝜀𝑦𝑡 on 𝑦𝑡 while 𝜙11(𝑖) represents the i-th period 
impact of a one unit change in 𝜀𝑦𝑡−𝑖 on 𝑦𝑡 (Enders 2010).  We can plot the impulse response 
functions to see the time path of the responses to shocks.  
 Since an estimated VAR is under-identified, the impulse responses require additional 
restrictions to be identified (Enders 2010). We utilize Choleski decomposition to orthogonalize the 
innovations to obtain our impulse responses (Wilson and Miljkovic 2013). Thus, the restriction 
alters the system so that 𝑦𝑡 will not contemporaneously effect 𝑧𝑡.  Again, following Enders (2010), 
we decompose the error terms in (60) such that: 
𝑒1𝑡 = 𝜀𝑦𝑡 − 𝑏12𝜀𝑧𝑡 (64) 
𝑒2𝑡 = 𝜀𝑧𝑡 (65) 
Thus, 𝜀𝑧𝑡 has a contemporaneous direct effect on both 𝑧𝑡 and 𝑦𝑡, while 𝜀𝑦𝑡 has a direct effect on 𝑦𝑡 
and an indirect effect on 𝑧𝑡 through lagged values of 𝑦𝑡.  Hence, the impulse response functions 
allow us to observe how endogenous variables respond to shocks within the system.  The results of 
our impulse responses can be found in section 6, along with the results of our estimated models.   
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5.8. Variance Decomposition 
The dynamic structure of our models can also be examined using variance decomposition, 
which breaks down the variance of the forecast errors for every endogenous variable into the 
percentage of the variance that can be credited to the other endogenous variables (Pindyck and 
Rubinfeld 1998).  This can be useful in identifying how large a role one variable has in effecting 
the variation of another variable over time.  
Once again, following Enders (2010), we can express the VMA in terms of its forecast 
errors. First, (63) can be expressed more compactly as: 
𝑥𝑡 = 𝜇 +∑𝜙𝑖𝜀𝑡−𝑖
∞
𝑖=0
(66) 
The n-period ahead forecast of (66) can be expressed as: 
𝑥𝑡+𝑛 = 𝜇 +∑𝜙𝑖𝜀𝑡+𝑛−𝑖
∞
𝑖=0
(67) 
Hence, we can represent the n-period ahead forecast error as: 
𝑥𝑡+𝑛 − 𝐸𝑡𝑥𝑡+𝑛 =∑𝜙𝑖𝜀𝑡+𝑛−𝑖
𝑛−1
𝑖=0
(68) 
Thus, for the variable 𝑦𝑡, we see the n-step ahead forecast error: 
𝑦𝑡+𝑛 − 𝐸𝑡𝑦𝑡+𝑛 = 𝜙11(0)𝜀𝑦𝑡+𝑛 + 𝜙11(1)𝜀𝑦𝑡+𝑛−1 +⋯+ 𝜙11(𝑛 − 1)𝜀𝑦𝑡+1 
                 +𝜙12(0)𝜀𝑧𝑡+𝑛 + 𝜙12(1)𝜀𝑧𝑡+𝑛−1 +⋯+ 𝜙12(𝑛 − 1)𝜀𝑧𝑡+1 (69) 
Where the n-period forecast error variance of 𝑦𝑡 is 𝜎𝑦(𝑛)
2: 
𝜎𝑦(𝑛)
2 = 𝜎𝑦
2[𝜙11(0)
2 + 𝜙11(1)
2 +⋯+ 𝜙11(𝑛 − 1)
2] 
                  +𝜎𝑧
2[𝜙12(0)
2 +𝜙12(1)
2 +⋯+ 𝜙12(𝑛 − 1)
2] (70) 
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Note that as the forecast horizon increases, so too will the forecast error variance due to the 
nonnegativity of all 𝜙𝑚𝑛(𝑖)
2 terms.   We can represent the proportion of 𝑦𝑡’s n-period forecast error 
variance due to shocks to 𝜀𝑦𝑡 as follows, 
𝜎𝑦
2[𝜙11(0)
2 + 𝜙11(1)
2 +⋯+ 𝜙11(𝑛 − 1)
2]
𝜎𝑦(𝑛)2
(71) 
also, the proportion due to shocks to 𝜀𝑧𝑡: 
𝜎𝑧
2[𝜙12(0)
2 + 𝜙12(1)
2 +⋯+ 𝜙12(𝑛 − 1)
2]
𝜎𝑦(𝑛)2
(72) 
The proportion of 𝑧𝑡’s n-period ahead forecast error variance can be decomposed in a similar 
fashion.  We also employ Choleski decomposition for our variance decomposition in the same 
manner as (64) and (65). Thus, for the one period ahead forecast error variance, all the variation in 
𝑧𝑡 is due to 𝜀𝑧𝑡 (Enders 2010).  We use this variance decomposition to see what percentage of the 
variance in futures price can be attributed to spot price over time or what percentage of the variation 
in spot price can be attributed to futures price.  The results of our variance decompositions are 
located in section 6 along with the results of our estimated models.  
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6. RESULTS 
The first step in our estimation process uses unit root testing to determine if each variable 
is stationary in levels or first differences.  We use the Engle-Granger cointegration test to determine 
if we estimate a VAR or a VECM.  If cointegration is present, we estimate a VECM; otherwise, we 
estimate a VAR.  For the VECM, we first estimate a restricted model where we impose a restriction 
on the speed of adjustment coefficients by setting them equal to test if futures price and spot price 
adjust at the same rate.  If we can reject that restriction, we then estimate a VECM with no 
restrictions on the speed of adjustment coefficients.  The endogenous variables are determined 
based on the results of the Granger causality and DAGs, keeping in mind that DAGs are a more 
powerful method since there are no a priori assumptions of the causal nature of the data (Li et al. 
2013).  The number of endogenous lags to include is determined by AIC, except for our national 
oil VECM, where we used our intuition to select the second-best model based on AIC. 
Once we estimate a model, we examine the impulse responses and variance decomposition.  
The impulse responses allow us to examine the size and duration of the impact a shock to one 
endogenous variable has in another endogenous variable.  The variance decomposition allows us to 
account for the percentage of variation in an endogenous variable which is made up by itself as well 
as by other endogenous variables over time.  For the innovation accounting, we are interested in 
how the futures market affects the spot market over a period of 36 months.  
6.1. National Oil 
For national oil, we found that futures price, RAC, and ending stocks are stationary in the 
first differences. The Engle-Granger cointegration test indicated that futures price and RAC are 
cointegrated.  The Granger tests had two-way causality between futures price and RAC significant 
at the 1% level as well as two-way causality between ending stocks and futures price at the 10% 
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level.  The DAG results suggest endogeneity between futures price and RAC.  Thus, on balance, 
futures price and RAC are endogenous and ending stocks can be treated as exogenous.  These results 
indicate that a VECM is appropriate; we estimate a model with three lags.  The results of the 
estimation are in table 8.  We see that we fail to reject the restriction on the speed of adjustment 
coefficients, indicating that futures and spot prices adjust at the same rate.  
We see that for the explanation of both the change in futures price and the change in RAC, 
the cointegration equation is significant indicating both RAC and FUTP adjust towards their long-
run equilibrium.  In the explanation of the first difference in futures price, we see that all three lags 
of ΔFUTP are significant with negative coefficients, while all three lags of RAC are significant 
with positive signs.  In the explanation of ΔRAC, the first two lags of futures price are significant 
with negative signs while the first two lags of RAC are significant with positive coefficients.  We 
see that the change in ending stocks is also significant at the 10% level with a negative coefficient.   
We can see the impulse responses and variance decompositions in Figure 1 and 2 below.  
The response of futures price to a shock in RAC leads to an increase in FUTP which appears to be 
permanent.  RAC response to a shock in futures price indicates an initial increase but ultimately a 
decreased price level around 15 months after the shock which remains permanently lower 
thereafter.  For the variance decompositions,  we see that RAC accounts for nearly 90% of the long-
term variance of futures price.  Futures price accounts for about 25% of RAC variance initially but 
accounts for only about 3% of the variance in the long run.  
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Table 8. National Oil Restricted VECM 
Cointegration Restrictions:   
      𝜋11 = 𝜋21  
Convergence achieved after 3 iterations. 
Not all cointegrating vectors are identified 
LR test for binding restrictions (rank = 1):  
Chi-square(1) 2.4606  
Probability 0.1167  
Cointegrating 
Eq: 
CointEq1 
  
FUTP(-1) -0.3761  
RAC(-1) 0.3440  
C 1.8085   
Error 
Correction: 
ΔFUTP ΔRAC 
CointEq1 
0.3682*** 0.3682*** 
[ 2.91725] [ 2.91725] 
ΔFUTP(-1) 
-0.8797*** -0.3020*** 
[-11.7452] [-3.26785] 
ΔFUTP(-2) 
-0.5223*** -0.2095** 
[-6.35323] [-2.06536] 
ΔFUTP(-3) 
-0.1170** -0.0197 
[-2.01945] [-0.27571] 
ΔRAC(-1) 
1.3365*** 0.6976*** 
[ 19.3245] [ 8.17531] 
ΔRAC(-2) 
0.7506*** 0.3468*** 
[ 7.44699] [ 2.78870] 
ΔRAC(-3) 
0.1874* -0.0761 
[ 1.94051] [-0.63854] 
C 
0.0006 0.0751 
[ 0.00427] [ 0.43173] 
ΔSTOCK 
0.0000 -0.00003* 
[ 0.95533] [-1.77404] 
R-squared 0.7432 0.4041 
t - statistics in [ ] 
*     10% Significance  
**    5% Significance  
***  1% Significance  
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Figure 1. Restricted National Oil Impulse Responses 
 
 
Figure 2. Restricted National Oil Variance Decomposition 
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6.2. Regional Oil 
6.2.1. PADD 2 
For PADD 2, we found that futures price and PADD 2 RAC are stationary in the levels 
while PADD 2 ending stocks is stationary in the first difference.  Thus, since 2 of the three variables 
are stationary, we cannot have a cointegrating vector between any of the three variables.  Granger 
causality indicates two-way causality between futures price and RAC. The FGES algorithm 
suggests endogeneity between futures price and RAC while the PC algorithm resulted in a cyclical 
graph.  Thus, 2 of the three causality tests suggest we can treat futures price and RAC as 
endogenous.   Since cointegration is not possible, we estimate a VAR model in the levels for PADD 
2 with three endogenous lags suggested by AIC.  The results are contained in Table 9.  
In the explanation of FUTP, the second and third lags of FUTP are significant with positive 
coefficients, all three lags of RAC are significant, where the first lag has a positive coefficient and 
the second and third lags have negative coefficients.  In explaining RAC, the first lag of FUTP is 
significant with a negative coefficient, and the third lag of FUTP is significant with a positive 
coefficient.  The first lag of RAC is significant with a positive coefficient while the third lag is 
significant at the 10% level with a negative coefficient.  Finally, the change in ending stocks is 
significant with a negative coefficient. 
Impulse responses in Figure 3 indicate that innovations in either endogenous variable have 
transitory effects. The variance decomposition in Figure 4 indicates that RAC plays an increasing 
role in the variation in FUTP, accounting for nearly 90% by the 36th period.  FUTP also plays a 
decreasing role in the variation of RAC while accounting for 27% in the first period and only 7% by 
the 36th period.   
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Table 9. PADD 2 VAR 
  FUTP 
PADD2 
RAC 
FUTP(-1) 
-0.1047 -0.3794*** 
[-1.15603] [-3.20409] 
FUTP(-2) 
0.2265** -0.0355 
[2.59759] [-0.31127] 
FUTP(-3) 
0.3284*** 0.2171** 
[4.28703] [2.16743] 
PADD2     
RAC(-1) 
1.4506*** 1.6677*** 
[20.4559] [17.9834] 
PADD2      
RAC(-2) 
-0.4053*** -0.1996 
[-2.97043] [-1.11864] 
PADD2     
RAC(-3) 
-0.5258*** -0.3197* 
[-4.12921] [-1.91980] 
C 
2.5901 3.8435 
[2.76032] [3.13229] 
ΔPADD2 
STOCKS 
0.0000 -0.0002** 
[-0.52013] [-2.44462] 
R-squared 0.9808 0.9683 
t - statistics in [ ] 
*     10% Significance  
**    5% Significance  
***  1% Significance  
 
  
 72 
 
Figure 3. PADD 2 Impulse Responses 
 
 
Figure 4. PADD 2 Variance Decomposition 
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6.2.2. PADD 3 
Futures price and PADD 3 RAC are stationary in the levels while PADD 3 ending stocks is 
stationary in the first difference.  Once again, two of the three variables are stationary, so we cannot 
have a cointegrating vector between any of the three variables.  RAC Granger causes futures price 
at the 1% level while futures price Granger causes RAC at the 10% level. For DAGs, both 
algorithms produce graphs with an undirected edge between futures price and RAC, and between 
futures price and ending stocks. Thus, DAGs suggest three endogenous variables, so we estimate a 
VAR with all three variables as endogenous where AIC suggests three lags.  
The results of PADD 3 VAR can be seen in Table 10. For the explanation of the change in 
ending stocks, we can see that the differenced third lag of PADD3 STOCKS is significant with a 
negative sign, while the first lag of FUTP is significant with a positive sign and the second lag of 
FUTP is significant with a negative sign.  For FUTP we see the differenced first lag of ending stocks 
is significant, all three lags of FUTP are significant with positive signs with the first significant at 
the 10% level, while all three lags of RAC are significantly different from zero with the first having 
a positive sign and the latter two having negative signs.  In the explanation of RAC, we see that 
only the first and second lag of RAC are significant with the first having a positive sign and the 
second having a negative sign.   
The impulse responses and variance decompositions of our second PADD 3 model can be 
seen in Figure’s 5 and 6. We can see that a shock to FUTP or RAC does not prompt much of a 
response in PADD 3 stocks and the minor effects are over within a few months.  The response of 
FUTP to an innovation in ending stocks causes a decrease in price which appears to be slowly 
decaying back towards zero in the long run while a shock to RAC causes an increased price which 
also appears to be slowly reverting towards zero in the long run.  A shock to ending stocks prompts 
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a similar response in RAC as it did in FUTP, while a shock to futures price causes an initial increase 
in RAC’s before returning to near zero. For the variance decompositions, we can see that ending 
stock variance is mostly accounted for due to its own innovations, while the variance of futures 
price is about 70% due to RAC in the long term.  RAC’s variance is also mostly accounted for by 
its own innovations.   
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Table 10. PADD 3 VAR 
  
ΔPADD3 
STOCKS 
FUTP 
PADD3 
RAC 
ΔPADD3 
STOCKS(-1) 
0.1267 -0.00008** 0.0000 
[1.61619] [-2.13913] [-1.52744] 
ΔPADD3 
STOCKS(-2) 
0.0108 0.0000 0.0000 
[0.13580] [0.42115] [0.47446] 
ΔPADD3 
STOCKS(-3) 
-0.2168*** 0.0000 0.0000 
[-2.72393] [-1.04923] [-0.50655] 
FUTP(-1) 
408.8833** 0.1783* -0.1766 
[2.03406] [1.93884] [-1.61193] 
FUTP(-2) 
-423.9653** 0.2674*** -0.0927 
[-2.33122] [3.21488] [-0.93533] 
FUTP(-3) 
148.7819 0.2949*** 0.1051 
[0.85927] [3.72384] [1.11399] 
PADD3     
RAC(-1) 
-230.2248 1.359*** 1.6061*** 
[-1.30829] [16.8821] [16.7446] 
PADD3     
RAC(-2) 
-152.2992 -0.7224*** -0.3676** 
[-0.49394] [-5.12212] [-2.1872] 
PADD3      
RAC(-3) 
267.8779 -0.4278*** -0.1325 
[0.99388] [-3.46948] [-0.90207] 
C 
-915.0586 3.5975 4.267 
[-0.37020] [3.18174] [3.16705] 
R-squared 0.1178 0.9747 0.9704 
t - statistics in [ ]   
*     10% Significance   
**    5% Significance   
***  1% Significance   
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Figure 5. PADD 3 Impulse Responses 
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Figure 6. PADD 3 Variance Decomposition 
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6.2.3. PADD 4 
For PADD 4, again we have futures price and PADD 4 RAC as stationary in the levels while 
PADD 4 ending stocks is stationary in the first difference.  Granger causality indicates two-way 
causality between futures price and RAC. The DAGs suggest endogeneity between futures price 
and RAC.  Thus, we estimate a VAR in the levels with three lags based on AIC, with the results in 
Table 11. 
In explaining FUTP, the second and third lag of FUTP are significant with positive 
coefficients,  the first and third lag of RAC are significant with the first having a positive coefficient 
and the third having a negative coefficient.  In the explanation of RAC, the first and third lag of 
FUTP is significant with the first having a negative coefficient and the third lag having a positive 
coefficient.  The first and third lag of RAC are also significant with the first having a positive 
coefficient and the third having a negative coefficient.  
Once again, in Figure 7, we see that a shock to an endogenous variable has increasing effects 
in the short term, but they are ultimately transitory as the effects are practically nonexistent by the 
36th month.  For the variance decomposition results in Figure 8, we find that once again RAC plays 
an increasing role in the variation of FUTP as time increases.  FUTP accounts for about 33% of 
RAC variance in the first period, dips to about 24% in the third period, and rises to about 30% again 
by the 36th period.   
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Table 11. PADD 4 VAR 
  FUTP 
PADD4 
RAC 
FUTP(-1) 
-0.0093 -0.3219** 
[-0.09629] [-2.36133] 
FUTP(-2) 
0.2339** 0.1606 
[2.41308] [1.17159] 
FUTP(-3) 
0.1920*** 0.2043** 
[2.98048] [2.24168] 
PADD4     
RAC(-1) 
1.1771*** 1.4907*** 
[16.9714] [15.1951] 
PADD4      
RAC(-2) 
-0.1619 -0.1336 
[-1.3628] [-0.79502] 
PADD4     
RAC(-3) 
-0.3866*** -0.4596*** 
[-3.50636] [-2.94706] 
C 
0.4341 3.7973 
[0.43726] [2.70422] 
ΔPADD4 
STOCKS 
0.0004 -0.0002 
[0.92816] [-0.26875] 
R-squared 0.9755 0.9411 
t - statistics in [ ] 
*     10% Significance  
**    5% Significance  
***  1% Significance  
 
  
 80 
 
Figure 7. PADD 4 Impulse Responses 
 
 
Figure 8. PADD 4 Variance Decomposition 
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6.2.4. PADD 5 
In PADD 5, the final PADD, we see that futures price, RAC and ending stocks are all 
stationary in the levels.  Granger causality indicates two-way causality between futures price and 
RAC while the DAGs indicate endogeneity between futures price and RAC.  Therefore, we estimate 
a VAR in the levels with three lags based on AIC, with the results in Table 12. 
The results for PADD 5 suggests that all three lags of FUTP and RAC are all significant in 
explaining FUTP.  We see that the signs of the three FUTP lags and the first RAC lag are all positive 
while the second and third lags of RAC have negative signs.  In the explanation of RAC, the first 
lag of FUTP and third lag of RAC are significant with both having a negative coefficient, while the 
first lag of RAC is also significant with a positive sign.  
PADD 5 impulse responses in Figure 9 show similar patterns as other PADDs.  A shock to 
RAC has an increasing effect in the first few months but begins decreasing thereafter.  While it 
does not entirely return to zero, FUTP response appears to be trending toward zero by the 36th 
period. A shock to FUTP also appears to have transitory effects on RAC after an early increase in 
standard deviation dissipates.  Again, variance decomposition for PADD 5, indicated in Figure 10, 
suggests RAC plays an increasing role in FUTP variance as time passes.  Conversely, FUTP plays 
a decreasing role in RAC variance as time passes.   
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Table 12. PADD 5 VAR 
  FUTP 
PADD5 
RAC 
FUTP(-1) 
0.2342** -0.3978*** 
[ 2.48305] [-3.59301] 
FUTP(-2) 
0.3929*** 0.1337 
[ 3.95812] [ 1.14756] 
FUTP(-3) 
0.1694** 0.1436 
[ 2.03740] [ 1.47141] 
PADD5 
RAC(-1) 
1.1047*** 1.6176*** 
[ 13.2874] [ 16.5750] 
PADD5 
RAC(-2) 
-0.4910*** -0.2588 
[-3.54446] [-1.59164] 
PADD5 
RAC(-3) 
-0.4511*** -0.2935** 
[-3.77787] [-2.09373] 
C 
0.2519 1.9961 
[ 0.03893] [ 0.26281] 
PADD5 
STOCKS 
0.0001 0.0000 
[ 0.44847] [ 0.29025] 
R-squared 0.9671 0.9630 
t - statistics in [ ] 
*     10% Significance  
**    5% Significance  
***  1% Significance  
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Figure 9. PADD 5 Impulse Responses 
 
 
Figure 10. PADD 5 Variance Decomposition 
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6.3. Corn 
Unit root testing for corn indicated that futures price, price received (SPOT), and ending 
stocks are all stationary in their first differences. Cointegration testing suggests the presence of a 
cointegrating vector between futures price and SPOT.  Granger causality does not indicate any two-
way causality, only futures price Granger causing spot price. The FGES algorithm suggests 
endogeneity of futures price and SPOT, while the PC algorithm produced a graph with undirected 
edges between futures price and SPOT as well as between futures price and ending stocks.  
Although the endogeneity is not entirely clear, given the data-driven approach and higher power of 
DAGs, we are comfortable moving forward with endogenous variables of FUTP and SPOT.  Thus, 
we estimate a VECM where AIC indicated one lag is the best specification.  In Table 13, we see 
that we can reject the speed of adjustment coefficient, indicating futures and spot price adjust at 
different rates. The results of our unrestricted VECM are contained in Table 14.  
For the cointegrating vector, we see that the lag of SPOT is significant with a negative 
coefficient.  In explaining the first difference of futures price, we find that only the first lag of FUTP 
price is significant with a negative sign.  In explaining the first difference of spot price, we see that 
the cointegrating vector is significant with a positive coefficient suggesting spot price adjusts 
towards the long run relationship with futures price.  Also, the first lag of FUTP is significant with 
a positive coefficient, the first lag of SPOT is significant with a negative sign, and the first 
difference of ending stocks is significant while the coefficient rounded to 4 decimal places is 0; 
however, we can see that it is negative, indicating an increase in ending stocks has a very small 
negative impact on spot price.   
The impulse responses for corn are located in Figure 11.  We see that an innovation in SPOT 
has a permanent decreasing effect to FUTP level by nearly $0.10 in the long run.  Conversely, a 
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shock to FUTP appears to have a permanent increasing effect to the level of SPOT by over $0.40 
in the long run.  Investigating the variance decompositions in Figure 12, we see that SPOT accounts 
for a tiny percentage of the variability of FUTP at only about 2% by the 36th period.  On the other 
hand, FUTP has a significant increasing role in the volatility of SPOT through time, accounting for 
97% of the variance in the 36th period. Thus, in the long run, futures markets increase the level of 
spot price and are a key driver of volatility. 
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Table 13. Corn Restricted VECM 
Cointegration Restrictions:   
      𝜋11 = 𝜋21  
Convergence achieved after 4 iterations. 
Not all cointegrating vectors are identified 
LR test for binding restrictions (rank = 1):  
Chi-square(1) 5.3135  
Probability 0.02116**  
Cointegrating 
Eq: 
CointEq1 
  
FUTP(-1) -2.5251  
SPOT(-1) 2.835474  
C 0.0780   
Error 
Correction: 
ΔFUTP ΔSPOT 
CointEq1 
-0.1125*** -0.1125*** 
[-7.63874] [-7.63874] 
ΔFUTP(-1) 
-0.1966* 0.1050** 
[-1.94025] [ 2.29121] 
ΔSPOT(-1) 
0.0034 -0.1715*** 
[ 0.02733] [-3.02790] 
C 
0.0091 0.0093 
[ 0.27721] [ 0.63005] 
ΔSTOCK 
0.0000 0.0000*** 
[ 0.76798] [-3.66922] 
R-squared 0.0240 0.5033 
t - statistics in [ ] 
*     10% Significance  
**    5% Significance  
***  1% Significance  
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Table 14. Corn VECM 
Cointegrating 
Eq: 
CointEq1 
  
FUTP(-1) 1.0000  
SPOT(-1) 
-1.0994***  
[-32.4578]  
C -0.1143   
Error 
Correction: 
ΔFUTP ΔSPOT 
CointEq1 
0.1093 0.2912*** 
[ 1.31364] [ 7.74185] 
ΔFUTP(-1) 
-0.1847** 0.1064*** 
[-1.82344] [ 2.32353] 
ΔSPOT(-1) 
0.0052 -0.1759*** 
[ 0.04149] [-3.09864] 
C 
0.0090 0.0093 
[ 0.27453] [ 0.63093] 
ΔSTOCK 
0.0000 0.0000*** 
[ 0.74490] [-3.66512] 
R-squared 0.0212 0.5026 
t - statistics in [ ] 
*     10% Significance  
**    5% Significance  
***  1% Significance  
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Figure 11. Corn Impulse Responses 
 
 
Figure 12. Corn Variance Decomposition 
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6.4. Soybeans 
The KPSS test for soybeans suggests that all three variables are stationary in the first 
differences.  Engle-Granger indicates a cointegrating relationship between futures price and price 
received (SPOT).  Two way Granger causality exists between futures price and price received.  Both 
DAG algorithms suggest endogeneity between FUTP and SPOT.  Thus, we estimate a VECM with 
three lags.  Table 15 indicates we can reject the speed of adjustment restriction; results for the 
unrestricted VECM are located in Table 16.  
In the cointegrating equation, lagged SPOT is significant with a negative coefficient.  In 
explaining the first difference of FUTP, the third lag of FUTP is significant with a negative sign 
while the first two lags of SPOT are significant with positive signs. In explaining the first difference 
of SPOT, the cointegrating vector is significant with a positive adjustment coefficient, while the 
first lag of FUTP and the first difference of STOCK are significant at the 10% level. 
The soybean impulse responses are located in Figure 13 while the variance decomposition 
is located in Figure 14.  A shock to SPOT prompts a permanent increase in FUTP by nearly $0.20 
in the long run.  Similarly, an innovation in FUTP elicits a permanently increased response in the 
standard deviation of SPOT by almost $0.80 in the long run.  SPOT also comprises only a small 
portion of FUTP variance, accounting for only 4% in the 36th period.  A large portion of SPOT 
variance is made up of FUTP, which accounts for 95% of the variance by the 36th month.   
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Table 15. Soybeans Restricted VECM 
Cointegration Restrictions:   
            𝜋11 = 𝜋21 
 
Convergence achieved after 4 iterations. 
Not all cointegrating vectors are identified 
LR test for binding restrictions (rank = 1):  
Chi-square(1) 12.1863  
Probability 0.0005***  
Cointegrating 
Eq: 
CointEq1 
  
FUTP(-1) -2.4268  
SPOT(-1) 2.7277  
C -0.6460   
Error 
Correction: 
ΔFUTP ΔSPOT 
CointEq1 
-0.1414*** -0.1414*** 
[-5.26514] [-5.26514] 
ΔFUTP(-1) 
-0.0993 0.0972 
[-0.69228] [ 1.55799] 
ΔFUTP(-2) 
-0.1580 0.0122 
[-1.20074] [ 0.21322] 
ΔFUTP(-3) 
-0.3841*** -0.0829* 
[-3.52441] [-1.74966] 
ΔSPOT(-1) 
0.5591*** 0.0386 
[ 2.64322] [ 0.42009] 
ΔSPOT(-2) 
0.6224*** 0.0071 
[ 3.16849] [ 0.08350] 
ΔSPOT(-3) 
-0.1346 -0.0596 
[-0.84841] [-0.86412] 
C 
0.0199 0.0279 
[ 0.30284] [ 0.97655] 
ΔSTOCK 
0.0000 0.0000* 
[ 0.22118] [-1.79880] 
R-squared 0.1519 0.4335 
t - statistics in [ ] 
*     10% Significance  
**    5% Significance  
***  1% Significance  
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Table 16. Soybeans VECM 
Cointegrating 
Eq: 
CointEq1 
  
FUTP(-1) 1.0000  
SPOT(-1) 
-1.0870***  
[-48.1708]  
C -0.0677   
Error 
Correction: 
ΔFUTP ΔSPOT 
CointEq1 
-0.1888 0.2791*** 
[-1.18789] [ 3.99476] 
ΔFUTP(-1) 
-0.0328 0.1105* 
[-0.22842] [ 1.74986] 
ΔFUTP(-2) 
-0.1175 0.0214 
[-0.89542] [ 0.37160] 
ΔFUTP(-3) 
-0.3637*** -0.0780 
[-3.34896] [-1.63313] 
ΔSPOT(-1) 
0.5212** 0.0263 
[ 2.47882] [ 0.28444] 
ΔSPOT(-2) 
0.6140*** -0.0018 
[ 3.14131] [-0.02114] 
ΔSPOT(-3) 
-0.1022 -0.0631 
[-0.63985] [-0.89862] 
C 
0.0163 0.0277 
[ 0.24854] [ 0.96286] 
ΔSTOCK 
0.0000 0.0000* 
[ 0.21704] [-1.76599] 
R-squared 0.1572 0.4249 
t - statistics in [ ] 
*     10% Significance  
**    5% Significance  
***  1% Significance  
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Figure 13. Soybeans Impulse Responses 
 
 
Figure 14. Soybeans Variance Decomposition 
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6.5. Hard Red Spring Wheat 
For HRS wheat, futures price and price received are stationary in the first differences, while 
ending stocks are stationary in the levels. The cointegration tests provide evidence of a cointegrating 
relationship between futures price and price received.  Granger causality tests indicate two-way 
causality between futures price and price received.  The FGES algorithm suggests endogeneity 
between futures price and price received while the PC algorithm provides a graph with an 
undirected edge between futures price and price received and an undirected edge between futures 
price and ending stocks.  On balance, the evidence suggests futures price and price received are 
endogenous variables.  We estimate a VECM with four lags, with the results in Table 17.  We can 
see that we fail to reject the restriction the speed of adjustment coefficient, indicating futures and 
spot price adjust at the same rate.  
We see that the cointegration equation is significant with a negative coefficient in explaining 
the first difference of futures price and spot price.  For futures price, the fourth lag of FUTP is 
significant with a positive coefficient, and the first and third lags of SPOT are significant with 
negative coefficients. In explaining ΔSPOT, the first lag of futures price is significant with a 
positive coefficient, the first and second lags of SPOT are significant with the first having a positive 
coefficient and the second having a negative coefficient. The change in ending stocks is also 
significant with a negative coefficient rounded to zero at decimal four places suggesting an increase 
in ending stocks has a small inverse effect on spot price.  
Impulse responses and variance decompositions are contained in Figure 15 and 16.  We can 
see that a shock to SPOT decreases FUTP by about $0.50 in the long term.  An innovation in FUTP 
prompts a permanent long-term increase in the level of spot price by about $1.20.  For the 
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decomposition of FUTP variance, SPOT accounts for about 13% of the long run variance.  Futures 
price accounts for about 87% of the variance of spot price in the long run.  
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Table 17. HRS Wheat Restricted VECM 
Cointegration Restrictions:   
      𝜋11 = 𝜋21  
Convergence achieved after 3 iterations. 
Not all cointegrating vectors are identified 
LR test for binding restrictions (rank = 1):  
Chi-square(1) 1.8634  
Probability 0.1722  
Cointegrating 
Eq: 
CointEq1 
  
FUTP(-1) -3.1454  
SPOT(-1) 3.4326  
C -0.0021   
Error 
Correction: 
ΔFUTP ΔSPOT 
CointEq1 
-0.1227*** -0.1227*** 
[-5.98533] [-5.98533] 
ΔFUTP(-1) 
0.1291 0.1930** 
[ 0.64163] [ 2.52463] 
ΔFUTP(-2) 
0.3201 0.0427 
[ 1.63952] [ 0.57512] 
ΔFUTP(-3) 
0.2536 -0.0136 
[ 1.42089] [-0.20008] 
ΔFUTP(-4) 
0.3823*** 0.0314 
[ 3.25612] [ 0.70520] 
ΔSPOT(-1) 
-1.2193*** -0.3538*** 
[-4.40519] [-3.36563] 
ΔSPOT(-2) 
-0.0886 0.2362** 
[-0.33096] [ 2.32307] 
ΔSPOT(-3) 
-0.4803** -0.0834 
[-2.01267] [-0.92018] 
ΔSPOT(-4) 
0.2504 -0.0450 
[ 1.44574] [-0.68481] 
C 
0.0154 0.0104 
[ 0.25960] [ 0.46373] 
ΔSTOCK 
0.0000 0.0000*** 
[-1.42095] [-3.27995] 
R-squared 0.2239 0.6253 
t - statistics in [ ] 
*     10% Significance  
**    5% Significance  
***  1% Significance  
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Figure 15. Restricted HRS Wheat Impulse Responses 
 
 
Figure 16. Restricted HRS Wheat Variance Decomposition 
 
 
  
 97 
7. CONCLUSIONS 
To examine the relationships between futures prices, spot prices, and inventory levels we 
utilized VAR/VEC models.  We used unit root testing which, for the most part, suggested prices 
and inventories were stationary in the first differences.  Cointegration testing revealed that futures 
prices and spot prices have a long-run equilibrium relationship for all commodities except for the 
regional oil PADD’s. We determined endogeneity of variables using both Granger causality and 
DAG techniques which mostly suggested futures price and spot price were endogenous while 
ending stocks are exogenous.  Impulse responses revealed that shocks in the futures market have a 
permanent increasing effect on the price level of the agricultural spot markets while national oil 
spot prices decrease in the long run and the regional oil PADD’s impulses have transitory increasing 
effects.  From our variance decompositions, we see that futures markets account for over 90% of 
the long-term variance in spot prices for the corn, soybeans, and nearly 90% for wheat.  For oil, we 
see that futures markets play a much small role in the spot price variance over time while most of 
the long-term futures price variance can be attributed to the spot market. 
It has generally been believed among scholars and experts that futures markets have a 
stabilizing effect on spot prices.  The underpinnings of this price stabilizing relationship seem to 
make sense on an intuitive level.  However, our empirical results for the agricultural commodities 
run counter to what one would expect to find.  Our findings of price destabilization coupled with 
the theory would indicate that the dominant stochastic factor in agricultural markets is either 
inventory demand disturbances or production disturbances.  We see oil price is destabilized initially, 
while the national oil is stabilized in the long run and regional oil returns to nearly no effects long 
term.  The theory would seem to indicate that production disturbances are the dominant stochastic 
factor in the oil markets.  To us, the contradictory nature of some of the results indicates that there 
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may still be phenomena at play in the related markets for storable commodities which are not fully 
understood.  We do not believe our results should serve as the end of the discussion on the 
stabilizing/destabilizing nature of futures markets; they should serve as a prompt that more work 
should be done to better understand the effects of futures markets on the volatility and behavior of 
spot prices of storable commodities. 
Given that there is no clear consensus on the effects of futures markets on spot markets in 
this thesis or the field in general, we feel it to be entirely premature to draw any type of policy 
conclusions from our results.  As mentioned, more research must be done in this area so we may at 
some point come to a uniform understanding of the relationship between futures market and spot 
market volatility.  It is also possible that, given our differing results between oil and agricultural 
commodities, this area may be too nuanced for a uniform policy response (if one is necessary) 
across the board.  We hope that this thesis and future works by scholars in this area will reveal more 
clearly any policy implications that arise due to the relationship between futures and spot markets. 
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